Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 1, Number 1, Fall 2015 | Page 23

Global Security and Intelligence Studies
they share sensitive assets, capabilities, and resources (Walsh 2007).
Finally, we specifically highlight the impact of regime change on an
intelligence-sharing relationship, finding support that regime change does in fact
alter this relationship (Morrow 1991). It is argued that if one of the participants in
the relationship experiences a significant regime change in which policies or interests
change, a shift or defection in the intelligence-sharing agreement can be expected
(Morrow 1991). Likewise, we can expect the reverse to be true when there is an
additional change in leadership that returns like-minded leaders and original policies
to their historical status. In this case, the relationship can return back to the previous
relationship.
We took these theories and applied them to the case of the Egyptian and U.S.
intelligence-sharing relationship, finding empirical evidence supporting our claim that
this relationship does, in fact, contain similar interests—historically (under Mubarak)
and currently (under el-Sisi). On the basis of our historical case study, we demonstrate
that Egypt and the United States had under Mubarak, and still have under el-Sisi, similar
interests in the category of security that warrant an intelligence-sharing relationship.
These security interests can be broken down into two subcategories: (1) stability in the
region and (2) countering terrorism (also known as Islamic fundamentalism) (Olson
1971; Walsh 2007). We demonstrate that these similar interests brought the two
countries closer together and served as the foundation of the intelligence relationship.
These interests are also what brought the relationship back together under el-Sisi
(Walsh 2007).
To support these claims, we present the historical intelligence relationship of
Egypt and the United States, specifically identifying the security factors we note above
and showing how they contribute to intelligence cooperation. To perform this task,
the article is organized into two sections: (1) evolution of intelligence relationship and
(2) present and future challenges. The first section provides the background necessary
to understand the political and historical context of the Egyptian–U.S. intelligence
relationship, and how this relationship has shown to strengthen throughout the years
based on interests. We focus on the key historical events that show those mutual
interests and benefits between Egypt and the United States. The events that specifically
highlight those mutual interests and benefits include President Anwar Sadat’s
assassination, which resulted in Mubarak taking over the presidency, the Egyptian–
Israeli peace agreements, the Afghan War, the First Gulf War, the terrorist attacks on
9/11, and the Second Gulf War.
The second section of this article focuses on the present state of the intelligence
agency, which was significantly impacted during the Arab Spring and the overthrow
of Mubarak. This demonstrates that if regime change impacts previously agreed to
benefits and interests, a shift or defection in the intelligence sharing can be expected
(Walsh 2007). Additionally, we examine the future status and challenges between the
United States and Egypt now that el-Sisi has been elected president. Finally, we discuss
why we perceive that the intelligence relationship has returned to its historical status
and that el-Sisi will continue to share intelligence with the United States in a “business
as usual” manner.
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