Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 1, Number 1, Fall 2015 | Page 22

Business As Usual: The Egyptian–U.S. Intelligence Relationship
to meet those needs” (Lowenthal 2008, 2). For purposes such as avoiding strategic
surprise and providing long-term expertise on critical issues, countries consider their
intelligence agencies among the most important assets within their governments.
However, Arab countries view intelligence a little differently than the United
States, and rely heavily on their intelligence and security establishment mainly for
“coup-proofing,” regime security, and preserving the status quo. Their main goal, even
more important than preventing or conducting foreign espionage, is to avoid coups
and keep their current rulers in power (Sirrs 2010, 1).
Ironically, and “given the centrality of the security apparatus to the Arab
regime stability,” it is “surprising that so little has been written about the Mukhabarat
[intelligence agency] in any Arab state. Much more has been written about the
intelligence agencies of the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France, Israel,
China, and Germany than the individual Arab services” (Ignatius 2013). This gap in
knowledge hinders our ability to understand the impact of events such as the Arab
Spring, as well as provide policy recommendations regarding U.S. interests in the
region.
As new leadership takes hold in Egypt, there are still many questions we need
to ask, such as: “Will the Egyptian intelligence community continue to partner with
the United States?” and “Will the relationship with the United States be the same as
before, or experience a dramatic change now that Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has been elected
president?”
The aim of this article is to address these questions through the examination
of the Egyptian-U.S. intelligence relationship throughout history. We empirically
show that Egypt, while under the leadership of el-Sisi, will return to a “Mubarakera
intelligence-sharing relationship” with the United States. We argue that the events
leading up to today, with a short break under the leadership of Morsi, have proven that
Egypt and the United States share similar interest in regard to intelligence. Therefore
the intelligence relationship will continue as it did before under Mubarak, and be
“business as usual.”
We support this argument through the literature that has discussed similar
situations in the past, particularly in regard to intelligence sharing, alliance building,
and restructuring based on regime change (Olson 1971; Walsh 2007; Morrow 1991;
Siverson and Starr 1994). The theories we have uncovered to support our argument
explain that countries share intelligence because of similar interests, and both Egypt
and the United States may benefit by creating an intelligence-sharing relationship
based on those similar interests (Olson 1971; Walsh 2007).
Next, the intelligence they share will only be on “specific topics and sources
where the participant states’ interests are most closely aligned” (Walsh 2007). This
means that not all intelligence-sharing relationships will share every aspect of their
national security, but rather those areas where their interests most closely align.
This is based on the benefit each gains from the particular subject, as well as the fear
that one of the members could defect from the intelligence relationship based on a
change in government or policy (Walsh 2007). The fear of defection or change in the
intelligence-sharing relationship is naturally a large concern for countries because
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