Putin’s priorities
Putin’s next – and last – term as
President is likely to see him
attempt to cement a legacy,
FIFA WORLD CUP 2018: SECURITY RISKS
Russia will host the FIFA 2018 World Cup between 13 June and 16 July. Given the April
2017 bombing in the St Petersburg metro, security risks will be a concern. Riccardo
Dugulin assesses how realistic the threats are. Read the full article on the GRI site
UNREST
HOOLIGANISM
closely enmeshed with Russian With Putin set to win elections in Clashes involving Russian football
power on the international March, the opposition may seek to hooligans such as those witnessed at
capitalise on media attention to UEFA 2016 may be repeated, along
organise localised protests. They will with racially-motivated attacks.
be small and tightly controlled; with Russian ultra-nationalists may target
Putin’s domestic policy in the all eyes on Russia, police violence is foreign supporters or tourists with
new year will be reliant on unlikely. verbal abuse or physical altercation.
stage.
delivering the Russian people
pyrrhic victories that help
bolster national pride, while
doing very little to actually
provide the structural
adjustments Russia so
desperately needs. This will
undoubtedly be made easier by
the fact that Russia is hosting
the world’s biggest cultural
TERRORISM
Russia managed to prevent any attacks on the Sochi Olympics with a
massive security lockdown, but the World Cup takes place in 11 cities,
making it harder to secure. In addition to the known threat from
North Caucasus-based groups, Islamic State has also issued calls to
attack the World Cup. A rising number of recent foiled plots, against
New Year celebrations and the 2018 elections, give particular cause for
concern, indicating attack intent - but on the plus side, demonstrating
intelligence successes. Stadiums themselves are likely to have stringent
measures in place, but gathering places and transit points around venues
in Moscow, St Petersburg, Rostov, and Volgograd will be at highest risk.
event, the FIFA World Cup.
Meanwhile, the international arena will continue to provide successes for Russia. Russia is increasing its
portfolio of pragmatic allies in the Middle East, and is working to counterbalance the previously hegemonic
role of the Sunni-led US-aligned monarchies in the region. While Russia’s cooperation with Tehran has
always been pragmatic, the two sides will see ever more reason to work together to undermine the Sunni
monarchies; especially as the Islamic State enters its post-territory holding phase. Similarly, cooperation
with Turkey has always been pragmatic, and as Erdogan continues to move further away from the
democratic promise of his earlier years in power, he and Putin will continue to see each other as useful
allies.
In many ways the more interesting development is the new agreement the Russian armed forces have to
use an airbase in Egypt. While it is unlikely 2018 will see a rebirth of the Nasser-era Soviet-Egyptian alliance,
Cairo is receptive to the role that Russia can play domestically. With Trump in the White House, Moscow is
beginning to look like a more reliable partner in the fight against Islamic State, despite the human cost that
always comes with Russian military assistance.
In 2018, Ukraine will be the wildcard in Russian foreign policy. Neither Kiev nor Moscow want to fund the
cost of reconstructing the eastern portion or lose the symbolic significance of the conflict for domestic
political gain. Ultimately, Putin’s Ukraine policy will remain the same barring a drastic change of the facts on
the ground. With current domestic chaos in Ukraine and the developing Poroshenko-Saakashvili feud, there
is always the possibility that Ukraine could enter into a new phase of domestic political crisis that Russia will
look to exploit.
Read the full story, with more on economic outlook, on the GRI site
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