INSIDE EUROPE
environment and secure a mechanism to prevent a “hard
border” with Ireland. A single customs territory between the
EU and the UK would also be created. The idea of a transition
period was also fl oated, during which EU rules would still
apply to the UK. Added to this was also a non-binding
declaratory document on future trade relations. With some
justifi able grounds, critics felt that the UK was submitting to
vassal status, eff ectively permitting the EU to dictate terms
without a need to reciprocate an acknowledgement for UK
sovereignty.
This propelled yet another effort to unseat May in
December last year, Tory MPs got the necessary 48 letters
of no confi dence to support a challenge to her leadership. In
the words of Rees-Mogg, “the draft withdrawal agreement
presented to parliament today turned out to be worse than
anticipated and fails to meet the promises given to the nation
by the prime minister, either own account or on behalf of us
all in the Conservative Party Manifesto.”
Her infl exibility has also proven her undoing. Deadlines
set with the EU have passed and been revised. The defeat of
her Brexit plan by 432 votes to 202 in January this year was
the worst by a British administration in over a century. “In
all normal circumstances,” wrote economic commentator
Robert Peston in The Spectator (January 15, 2019), “a Prime
Minister would resign when suff ering such humiliation on
their central policy – and a policy Theresa May herself said
today would ‘set the future of this country for a generation’.”
In March, the fi gures were only marginally better for the same
outcome in two votes: 391 against and 242 for the second;
344 to 286 for the third.
But despite failing on each occasion to get her version
of a Brexit deal passed, her opponents have not done much
better. No confidence motions advanced by the Labour
Party have failed, and despite criticism from Corbyn that
the May administration remains stacked with zombies, it
survives. Towards the end of March, Parliament, in an act
of desperation, pondered over eight options as to how to
approach leaving the EU, an attempt to leave May out in
the cold and identify an alternative. Despite having a range
of options as to how to submit to the divorce process, none
garnered suffi cient support via paper ballot. Both extremes
– a no-deal Brexit, and a veto of the entire Article 50 process
were about as popular as the plague. The one to gather
most steam, and fall at the last hurdle, is the idea of keeping
Britain in the common market, a cord that riles the rawest
hard Brexit Tories. Speculatively, it suggests that the country
will eventually fi nd some form with the European countries
of Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein.
May remains the convenient symbol of hostility for
those who see her as all that has gone wrong with Britain
in the Brexit negotiations. Her lack of bendability has been
associated with weakness. Forgotten here is the process that
led to this state of circumstances, one which saw no plans
were drawn up, or anticipated contingencies in the event
of a pro-Brexit referendum result. The UK, in short, was
woefully ill-prepared for an outcome that was never genuinely
expected, even by many Brexiteers. All see the premiership
as doomed and she has more or less conceded that she will
not be prime minister in overseeing the implementation of
the Brexit process.
Critics, however, cannot help but feel worried at her
departure. As Polly Toynbee observed in The Guardian (Mar
28, 2019), “we may yet come to miss her, though she has
been the worst prime minister of our political lifetimes – bar
none.” Her presence refl ected a rueful Toynbee, “kept out the
barbarian hordes of Brexiteers barging one another out of the
way to seize her throne.” In November last year, the Financial
Times (Nov 19, 2018) expressed admiration for May, despite
being a “mediocre media performer” and a dogmatist. Her
Brexit deal, despite being seen as “rotten”, was “probably the
best that could be achieved if the starting point was ending
free movement of people.”
In failure, May has governed. In defeat, she has endured
with a stubbornness marked by a sentiment long expressed
by Margaret Thatcher: TINA, or “there is no alternative”.
Her period of governance has become comically desperate,
so much so she has sought the assistance of the previously
ignored Labour Party. Even at this writing, problems have
emerged, with Corbyn and Labour Party stalwarts insisting
that May has not made suffi cient adjustments or concessions.
For all the uncertainty, one fact remains: May, politically,
continues to remain prime minister.
* Author was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College,
Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne.
Email: [email protected]
46 • Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist • Vol 7 • Issue 4 • April-May 2019, Noida