INSIDE EUROPE
THERESA
MAY
PROFILE OF DIFFICULT DOOM
BY DR. BINOY KAMPMARK*
I
t may well come to be seen as the greatest constitutional
crisis in Britain since the 17th century. It was also one
precipitated by faulty planning, shoddy design and blithe
indiff erence to circumstance. Prime Minister Theresa May,
having developed in the shell and portfolio of internal security
and aff airs, found herself having to muster the whole gamut
of the state.
When she succeeded as Conservative Party leader, and in
doing so becoming the second prime minister of the UK, the
BBC (July 25, 2016) already observed that she was “taking
charge of the UK at one of the most turbulent times in recent
political history.” It also acknowledged a “carefully cultivated
image of political dependability and unfl appability” which
made her, at least at the initial appearance, as “the right person
at the right time as the fallout from the UK’s vote to leave the
EU smashed possible rivals out of contention.”
In an environment often hostile to women, she developed
a reputation for not wobbling and straight talking, reminding
her Conservative colleagues in 2002 that their party had
become known as “the nasty party”. But it was as Home
Secretary upon which she made her mark, becoming the
second longest serving home secretary in a hundred years.
In replacing Prime Minister David Cameron, May’s prime
ministership has come to be associated with one thing: leaving
the European Union in a way best refl ecting the wishes of
those who voted for that result in the 2016 referendum. She
hoped, in taking the reins, that Britain would “forge a new,
bold, positive role for ourselves in the world.”
Ma while continuing to live up to that image made various
blunders. She miscalculated in calling a needless general
election for June 2017 in the hope it would consolidate her
power and wipe out Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party. Instead,
Corbyn gained a strong foothold even as May’s negotiation
position in Brussels was weakened. The wounded prime
minister, for the survival of her government, also had to count
on the continued support of the DUP of Northern Ireland.
The election fundamentally undermined May and support
within her party. Her critics multiplied. Within her party,
absolute, mandatory cowardice took hold, a feeling that she
has betrayed the cause and required removal. Traditional Tory
positions asserted a monopoly of the Great Britain fantasy free
of European intrusion, to be defended with the zeal of urban
guerrillas. Arch critics Jacob Rees Mogg and Boris Johnson
remain persisting, sniping critics. Neither has managed to
strike a blow; all have failed in mounting a direct assault on
her positions, preferring catty rebukes and side blows.
In 2018, vain eff orts were made to unseat her. As with
each attempt, all seemed to have the quality of cowardice,
conviction from the rear, fear and incompetence at the front.
Signifi cantly, all have failed. In February, there were talks
of a hard Brexit troika comprising Michael Gove, Jacob
Rees-Mogg and Boris Johnson forcing their way into the
palace. Individuals such as international trade secretary Liam
Fox were left having to shore up the government position
constantly. He demanded an end to the “obsessive criticism”
of Brexit. “Brexit,” he told Conservative Home in January that
year, “is not a time bomb to be defused but a great opportunity
to be embraced.” His overseas trips have been greeted with
confi dence; on returning, he meets an enervating “self-
defeating pessimism that is too often on show from certain
politicians, commentators and media outlets over here.”
May’s version of a Brexit deal in November 2018 left all
unhappy. Running into almost six hundred pages is considered
a financial settlement with the EU to meet outstanding
commitments, negotiate the rights of British citizens on
the continent and EU citizens in the UK in a post-Brexit
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist • Vol 7 • Issue 4 • April-May 2019, Noida • 45