Knowledge Partner
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist
Federal Council( UNFC) comprising two groups that have not signed the NCA; and the Federal Poli * cal Nego * a * ons and Consulta * ve CommiQee( FPNCC) comprising the remaining groups who have not signed the document, led by the UWSA. Myanmar’ s ethnic stakeholders have historically been highly diverse and any further division could only complicate challenges of developing coherent posi * ons on key issues.
Despite Democracy
During her elec * on campaign to the 2015 parliamentary and provincial elec * ons, Suu Kyi had promised to make the peace process and na * onal reconcilia * on her priority. For Suu Kyi
Myanmar’ s ethnic stakeholders have historically been highly diverse and any further division could only complicate challenges of developing coherent posi @ ons on key issues. and the EAOs, federalism remains a key element in resolving Myanmar’ s decades of violence and ethnic conflict. However, apart from the fact that all poli * cians are hostages to their poli * cal ambi * ons, federalism has con * nued to denote different things to different actors.
Amid con * nuing contesta * on with the Tatmadaw, Suu Kyi’ s policies have demonstrated a clear unwillingness to break away from the military-led and chartered path. Although she cons * tuted a new government peace monitoring body, the Union Peace Dialogue Joint CommiQee( UPDJC), which replaced the previous Myanmar Peace Center and introduced a seven-point policy of na * onal reconcilia * on, these have been liQle more than tokenism. Two peace conferences – labelled the 21st Century Panglong Union Peace Conference – have been held under her regime. The third one was due to take place at the end of January 2018 but has been postponed. However, there are ques * ons about how effec * ve these mee * ngs have been. In spite of the tremendous poli * cal capital Suu Kyi has, both the civilian as well as the military leadership’ s inability to be magnanimous and accommoda * ve of some of the genuine concerns of the ethnic insurgencies have led to the process mee * ng a deadlock, at least since May 2017, when the second UPC was held.
External Actors
In addi * on to the EAOs, the Tatmadaw, and Myanmar’ s civilian government headed by Suu Kyi, external actors cons * tute the fourth and final set of stakeholders in the peace process. As men * oned before, while the Western countries linked the gradual withdrawal of sanc * ons to the progress of democracy in Myanmar, their commitment to the peace process with the EAOs was less than serious. Even as the war in the Kachin and other regions con * nued amid large-scale reports of human rights viola * ons, the Tatmadaw limited the access of the interna * onal NGOs and journalists to the region. In response, the UN feebly appealed to authori * es in Myanmar to be open and
transparent. The US merely underlined the need to bring peace to the violence-stricken regions. Even the Associa * on of Southeast Asian Na * ons( ASEAN), of which Myanmar was the chair between 2014 and 2015, chose to remain aloof by subscribing to its principle of noninterference in member countries’ domes * c affairs.
In contrast, China, Myanmar’ s northern neighbour, con * nues to play a complex role in the peace process, maintaining * es and influence over both the state and non-state actors in Myanmar. The EAOs in the Kachin and Shan States have had strong tradi * onal * es with China, making the laQer a direct stakeholder in the conflicts’ resolu * on. With some of the special interest groups within China funding the
Image 20: Children at the Ban Tractor refugee camp on the Thai / Myanmar border. Decades of conflict in Myanmar has led to forced displacement
China, Myanmar’ s northern neighbour, con @ nues to play a complex role in the peace process, maintaining @ es and influence over both the state and non-state actors in Myanmar.
Beijing’ s role has been further complicated. For example, local authori * es in Yunnan have previously developed extensive business * es in mining, logging, and crop subs * tu * on in Shan and Kachin States. These have taken place without the approval of the Myanmar or Chinese central authori * es. China has reportedly allowed the Myanmar Na * onal D e m o c r a * c A l l i a n c e A r m y( MNDAA), which s * ll fights the Tatmadaw to use its territory to evade the laQer’ s onslaught. The MNDAA has even been allowed to open a bank account in Beijing to collect dona * ons from the sympathe * c Chinese public. China’ s influence over the insurgencies remains unrivalled.
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