Knowledge Partner
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist
W
hy is the peace process with the ethnic insurgencies in Myanmar
flailing? Why has a near seven-year-old process not produced the
desired result? Why, ajer two prominent peace conferences held
amid much fanfare, is there liQle sign that figh*ng between some of the
ethnic armies and the Myanmar military would come to a halt? While
Myanmar’s democracy icon and its current State Counsellor Aung San Suu
Kyi would completely disagree with the basic tenor of such queries, the fact
remains that the failure of the peace process is a reality and is linked to the
inability of a range of actors — internal as well as external — to find common
ground. From a preven*ve diplomacy perspec*ve, an analysis of Myanmar’s
peace process must take the different actors, their interests, and the layers
of interplay of such interests into considera*on.
powerful Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s military) itself. Thereby, a process of
democra*c reforms, a condi*on imposed by the Western world, began.
While much of the change was happening in the core areas concerning
the future of democracy in the country’s heartland, peace processes with
the ethnic insurgencies in the country’s periphery was an equally key area
of reform.
The Flaws
The gradual ushering in of democracy and press freedom by the
Tatmadaw was somewhat monitored by the Western powers and linked to
the withdrawal of sanc*ons. However, the contours of the peace
processes with the insurgencies were not much of an area of their
interest. This allowed the Thein Sein regime to herald a hurried policy that
sought to implement an unrealis*c *meframe to establish peace in the
country’s resource-rich peripheries. This was the first major flaw of the
peace process. While about a dozen smaller and medium-sized ethnic
armed organisa*ons (EAOs)
were amenable to sign
While much of the change
individual ceasefire agreements
was happening in the core
with the government, the
larger and militarily more
areas concerning the future
powerful ones in the country’s
of democracy in the country’s
northern territories like the
heartland, peace processes
Kachin Independence Army
with the ethnic insurgencies
(KIA) and the United Wa State
in the country’s periphery
Army (UWSA) were less willing.
The Tatmadaw’s policy of
was an equally key area of
browbea*ng them into
reform.
submission ensured a strange
scenario where the president
was busy sending messages of peace and the military was unwilling to
cease its opera*ons against the KIA and others, which were ojen replete
with large-scale human rights viola*ons.
The Beginning
It is one thing to maintain that the peace process in Myanmar that began in
2011 was an ini*a*ve of the quasi-military govern ment led by then
President Thein Sein and quite another to place the decision of the military
in the overall context of Myanmar’s aQempt to emerge from a pariah status,
shunned by almost the en*re world that imposed a regime of sanc*ons on
the military junta. This sanc*ons regime ensured that Myanmar, a country of
over 50 million people, remained almost a hermit kingdom, much like North
Korea, even as the most of the Southeast Asian countries basked in the
sunshine of open market economic policies. A mobile phone connec*on, for
instance, was unaffordable for 99 per cent of the country’s popula*on,
whereas internet was non-existent. This regime, where the military was the
only power of consequence, had become unsustainable even for the all
Apart from the long-standing sense of autonomy that the EAOs enjoyed,
their domina*on over the respec*ve areas and associated lucra*ve
business interests which the ceasefire agreements wished to undermine,
the lack of a scope for poli*cal dialogue prior to the signing of the
agreement made the government's aQempt to establish peace less
aQrac*ve for a number of insurgencies. These EAOs have con*nued to
remain outside the Na*onal Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) signed in
October 2015. The NCA, in fact, is the second biggest flaw of the peace
process. While the military has made the signing of the NCA and
adherence to the controversial 2008 cons*tu*on mandatory for all EAOs,
as many as seven of the 15 groups invited to sign the document have
refused to do so. This has resulted in the crea*on of three blocs among
the EAOs—those who have signed the NCA; the United Na*onali*es
Image 19: Cadets from the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) preparing for military drills
at the group's headquarters in Laiza, Kachin State
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