Iran was well equipped to capitalize on Shi’i
grievances throughout the region and not only because it is overwhelmingly Shi’i itself. Its 1979 Islamic Revolution was orchestrated by mullahs who were in close touch with the masses who had been denied economic, political, and even
religious dignity by the Shah’s regime. The mullahs capitalized on the widespread desire for revenge, initially by channeling it into overthrowing the Shah, then into projecting power abroad in the name not of Shi’ism, but of assisting the poor and downtrodden. But until Hamas, a Sunni organization, accepted Iran’s overtures in 1992 better to counter the Oslo Accord peace process, Hizbullah, the Houthis, and the Badr Corps as well as other Iraqi militias, such as Iraqi Hizbullah, were all Shi’i, suggesting that Iran’s power projection rested entirely on those of that faith.
In the wake of October 7 this has changed dramatically. Iran is now viewed even in the Sunni world as a if not the principal supporter of the Palestinian cause. A poll taken between 17 and 29 October of 500 respondents each in the West Bank, Gaza, and five Arab countries, revealed overwhelming support for Hamas and Iran, and profound dissatisfaction with the U.S. Only 7% of respondents thought the U.S. was having a positive effect on “what’s going on in Gaza,” while 40% thought Iran was, the highest proportion for any state. 14% thought the EU was having a positive effect. 51% trusted Russia, compared to 9% for the U.S.
Hamas has thus enabled Iran to break out of its isolation within Middle Eastern Shi’i communities and to pose a yet more profound
threat to the U.S., to Israel, and to those Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with which it has intermittently been at loggerheads.
Moreover, the confrontation in Gaza has tightened Iran’s relationships with Russia,
China, and North Korea, while reducing tension
in its relations with Turkey. So almost regardless of what happens in Gaza, Iran will emerge as the big winner in this disastrous round of Israeli-Palestinian fighting.
Successive U.S. Administrations have contributed in three principal ways to Iran’s strategic success. First, since the Arab uprisings of 2011 they have largely ignored the denial of dignity in the region. Starting with Obama they have backed authoritarian Arab states that have acted separately and jointly to suppress popular uprisings and indeed, popular expression of virtually any sort. Although all U.S. presidents have paid lip service to democratization, ever less commitment has been made to that objective. Biden even stopped referring to it in his speeches and comments on the Middle East some two years ago. Other than the large oil exporters, all countries in the region have since 2020 experienced profound economic crises with devastating effects on their populations. The U.S. has failed to take the lead to alleviate them,
more or less hiding behind the World Bank and IMF, whose assistance is far less than necessary to reduce inflation, currency depreciation, and declining public services in these countries. For a decade the U.S. has
supported the dictators who have repressed
Hamas has thus enabled Iran to break out of its isolation within Middle Eastern Shi’i communities and to pose a yet more profound threat to the U.S., to Israel, and to those Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with which it has intermittently been at loggerheads.
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