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Defending the Constitution
suffrages are to be given, as it is in a monarchy to know who is the prince,
and after what manner he ought to govern.’’ The time, mode and place of
the election of Representatives, Senators and President-general of the
United States, ought not to be under the control of Congress, but fundamentally ascertained and established.
The new Constitution, consistently with the plan of consolidation,
contains no reservation of the rights and privileges of the State governments, which was made in the confederation of the year 1778, by article
the 2d, viz.: ‘‘That each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right which is not by this
confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.’’
The legislative power vested in Congress by the foregoing recited sections, is so unlimited in its nature, may be so comprehensive and boundless in its exercise, that this alone would be amply sufficient to annihilate
the State governments, and swallow them up in the grand vortex of a
general empire.
The judicial powers vested in Congress are also so various and extensive, that by legal ingenuity they may be extended to every case, and thus
absorb the State judiciaries; and when we consider the decisive influence that a general judiciary would have over the civil polity of the several States, we do not hesitate to pronounce that this power, unaided by
the legislative, would effect a consolidation of the States under one government.
The powers of a court of equity, vested by this Constitution in the tribunals of Congress—powers which do not exist in Pennsylvania, unless
so far as they can be incorporated with jury trial—would, in this State,
greatly contribute to this event. The rich and wealthy suitors would eagerly lay hold of the infinite mazes, perplexities and delays, which a
court of chancery, with the appellate powers of the Supreme Court in fact
as well as law would furnish him with, and thus the poor man being