The Address and Reasons of Dissent
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tion of Congress; that they must assemble for the appointment of the Senators and President-general of the United States. True, the State legislatures may be continued for some years, as boards of appointment merely,
after they are divested of every other function; but the framers of the
Constitution, foreseeing that the people will soon become disgusted with
this solemn mockery of a government without power and usefulness,
have made a provision for relieving them from the imposition in section
fourth of article first, viz.: ‘‘The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State
by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or
alter such regulations, except as to the place of choosing Senators.’’
As Congress have the control over the time of the appointment of the
President-general, of the Senators and of the Representatives of the United
States, they may prolong their existence in office for life by postponing the
time of their election and appointment from period to period under various pretenses, such as an apprehension of invasion, the factious disposition of the people, or any other plausible pretence that the occasion may
suggest; and having thus obtained life-estates in the government, they
may fill up the vacancies themselves by their control over the mode of
appointment; with this exception in regard to the Senators that as the
place of appointment for them must, by the Constitution, be in the particular State, they may depute some body in the respective States, to fill
up the vacancies in the Senate, occasioned by death, until they can venture to assume it themselves. In this manner may the only restriction in
this clause be evaded. By virtue of the foregoing section, when the spirit
of the people shall be gradually broken, when the general government
shall be firmly established, and when a numerous standing army shall
render opposition vain, the Congress may complete the system of despotism, in renouncing all dependence on the people by continuing themselves and children in the government.
The celebrated Montesquieu, in his Spirit of Laws, vol. i., page 12, says,
‘‘That in a democracy there can be no exercise of sovereignty, but by the
suffrages of the people, which are their will; now the sovereign’s will is
the sovereign himself—the laws, therefore, which establish the right of
suffrage, are fundamental to this government. In fact, it is as important
to regulate in a republic in what manner, by whom, and concerning what