The Federalist No. 47
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rior courts, but that the chief magistrate with his executive council are
appointable by the legislature; that two members of the latter are triennially displaced at the pleasure of the legislature; and that all the principal offices, both executive and judiciary, are filled by the same department. The executive prerogative of pardon, also, is in one case vested in
the legislative department.
The constitution of North-Carolina, which declares ‘‘that the legislative, executive and supreme judicial powers of government ought to be
forever separate and distinct from each other,’’ refers at the same time to
the legislative department, the appointment not only of the executive
chief, but all the principal officers within both that and the judiciary department.
In South-Carolina, the constitution makes the executive magistracy eligible by the legislative department. It gives to the latter, also, the appointment of the members of the judiciary department, including even
justices of the peace and sheriffs; and the appointment of officers in the
executive department, down to captains in the army and navy of the
State.
In the constitution of Georgia, where it is declared ‘‘that the legislative,
executive and judiciary departments shall be separate and distinct, so
that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other,’’ we find
that the executive department is to be filled by appointments of the legislature; and the executive prerogative of pardon to be finally exercised
by the same authority. Even justices of the peace are to be appointed by
the legislature.
In citing these cases in which the legislative, executive, and judiciary
departments have not been kept totally separate and distinct, I wish not
to be regarded as an advocate for the particular organizations of the several State governments. I am fully aware that among the many excellent
principles which they exemplify, they carry strong marks of the haste,
and still stronger of the inexperience, under which they were framed. It
is but too obvious that in some instances the fundamental principle under consideration has been violated by too great a mixture, and even an
actual consolidation of the different powers; and that in no instance has
a competent provision been made for maintaining in practice the sepa-