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Basic Constitutional Concepts
According to the constitution of Pennsylvania, the president, who is
head of the executive department, is annually elected by a vote in which
the legislative department predominates. In conjunction with an executive council, he appoints the members of the judiciary department and
forms a court of impeachments for trial of all officers, judiciary as well as
executive. The judges of the Supreme Court and justices of the peace
seem also to be removable by the legislature; and the executive power of
pardoning, in certain cases, to be referred to the same department. The
members of the executive council are made ex officio justices of peace
throughout the State.
In Delaware, the chief executive magistrate is annually elected by the
legislative department. The speakers of the two legislative branches are
vice-presidents in the executive department. The executive chief, with six
others, appointed three by each of the legislative branches, constitute the
Supreme Court of Appeals; he is joined with the legislative department
in the appointment of the other judges. Throughout the States it appears
that the members of the legislature may at the same time be justices of
the peace. In this State, the members of one branch of it are ex officio
justices of peace; as are also the members of the executive council. The
principal officers of the executive department are appointed by the legislative; and one branch of the latter forms a court of impeachments. All
officers may be removed on address of the legislature.
Maryland has adopted the maxim in the most unqualified terms; declaring that the legislative, executive and judicial powers of government
ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other. Her constitution, notwithstanding, makes the executive magistrate appointable by
the legislative department; and the members of the judiciary by the executive department.
The language of Virginia is still more pointed on this subject. Her constitution declares ‘‘that the legislative, executive and judiciary departments, shall be separate and distinct; so that neither exercise the powers
properly belonging to the other; nor shall any person exercise the powers
of more than one of them at the same time; except that the justices of the
county courts shall be eligible to either house of assembly.’’ Yet we find
not only this express exception, with respect to the members of the infe-