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Basic Constitutional Concepts
them. On the other side, the component parts of the State Government will
in no instance be indebted for their appointment to the direct agency of the
Federal government, and very little, if at all, to the local influence of its
members.
The number of individuals employed under the Constitution of the
United States will be much smaller than the number employed under the
particular States. There will consequently be less of personal influence on
the side of the former than of the latter. The members of the legislative,
executive and judiciary departments of thirteen and more States, the justices of the peace, officers of militia, ministerial officers of justice, with all
the county, corporation, and town-officers, for three millions and more of
people, intermixed and having particular acquaintance with every class
and circle of people must exceed, beyond all proportion, both in number
and influence, those of every description who will be employed in the
administration of the federal system. Compare the members of the three
great departments of the thirteen States, excluding from the judiciary department the justices of peace, with the members of the corresponding
departments of the single Government of the Union; compare the militia
officers of three millions of people with the military and marine officers
of any establishment which is within the compass of probability, or, I
may add, of possibility, and in this view alone, we may pronounce the
advantage of the States to be decisive. If the Federal Government is to
have collectors of revenue, the State Governments will have theirs also.
And as those of the former will be principally on the sea-coast, and not
very numerous, whilst those of the latter will be spread over the face of
the country, and will be very numerous, the advantage in this view also
lies on the same side. It is true that the Confederacy is to possess, and
may exercise, the power of collecting internal as well as external taxes
throughout the States; but it is probable that this power will not be resorted to, except for supplement purposes of revenue; that an option will
then be given to the States to supply their quotas by previous collections
of their own; and that the eventual collection under the immediate authority of the Union will generally be made by the officers, and according
to the rules, appointed by the several States. Indeed it is extremely probable that in other instances, particularly in the organization of the judicial
power, the officers of the States will be clothed with the correspondent