The Federalist No. 45
367
that the ruin of one of them proceeded from the incapacity of the federal
authority to prevent the dissensions, and finally the disunion, of the subordinate authorities. These cases are the more worthy of our attention, as
the external causes by which the component parts were pressed together,
were much more numerous and powerful than in our case; and consequently, less powerful ligaments within would be sufficient to bind the
members to the head, and to each other.
In the feudal system we have seen a similar propensity exemplified.
Notwithstanding the want of proper sympathy in every instance between
the local sovereigns and the people, and the sympathy in some instances
between the general sovereign and the latter, it usually happened that the
local sovereigns prevailed in the rivalship for encroachments. Had no external dangers enforced internal harmony and subordination, and particularly, had the local sovereigns possessed the affections of the people,
the great kingdoms in Europe would at this time consist of as many independent princes as there were formerly feudatory barons.
The State Governments will have the advantage of the Federal Government, whether we compare them in respect to the immediate dependence of the one or the other; to the weight of personal influence which
each side will possess; to the powers respectively vested in them; to the
predilection and probable support of the people; to the disposition and
faculty of resisting and frustrating the measures of each other.
The State Governments may be regarded as constituent and essential
parts of the Federal Government; whilst the latter is nowise essential to the
operation or organization of the former. Without the intervention of the
State Legislatures, the President of the United States cannot be elected at
all. They must in all cases have a great share in his appointment, and will
perhaps in most cases of themselves determine it. The Senate will be
elected absolutely and exclusively by the State Legislatures. Even the
House of Representatives, though drawn immediately from the people,
will be chosen very much under the influence of that class of men whose
influence over the people obtains for themselves an election into the State
Legislatures. Thus, each of the principal branches of the Federal Government will owe its existence more or less to the favor of the State Governments, and must consequently feel a dependence, which is much more
likely to beget a disposition too obsequious than too overbearing towards