The Federalist No. 10
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acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by
reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too
little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The Federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great
and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and in
particular to the State legislatures.
The other point of difference is the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of Republican
than of Democratic Government; and it is this circumstance principally
which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former
than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the
distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties
and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same
party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority,
and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the
sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you
make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common
motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive
exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own
strength and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments,
it may be remarked, that where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in
proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.
Hence, it clearly appears that the same advantage which a Republic
has over a Democracy in controlling the effects of faction is enjoyed by a
large over a small Republic—is enjoyed by the Union over the States
composing it. Does this advantage consist in the substitution of Representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and to schemes of injustice? It will not be denied
that the Representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these
requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a
greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to
outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased
variety of parties comprised within the Union increase this security?
Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and