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Basic Constitutional Concepts
citizens and greater sphere of country over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen
body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of
their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely
to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice pronounced by the representatives of the people will be more consonant to the public good than
if pronounced by the people themselves convened for the purpose. On
the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of
local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may by intrigue, by corruption or
by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests of
the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive Republics are most favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public
weal: and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations.
In the first place it is to be remarked that however small the Republic
may be, the Representatives must be raised to a certain number in order
to guard against the cabals of a few; and that however large it may be,
they must be limited to a certain number in order to guard against the
confusion of a multitude. Hence the number of Representatives in the
two cases, not being in proportion to that of the Constituents, and being
proportionally greatest in the small Republic, it follows, that if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small Republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater
probability of a fit choice.
In the next place, as each Representative will be chosen by a greater
number of citizens in the large than in the