CONTEMPORARY EURASIA IX ( 1 )
confessional leaderships that had achieved a virtual monopoly on the “ representation ” of their own community in Lebanon ’ s confessional political system . The same was not true for the highly fragmented politics of the Sunni community , which made it easier for new businessmen to rise to the top .
This paper is divided into three sections : the first one observes the rise of the new contractors during the second civil war from 1975 to 1990 . The second section focuses on Rafik Hariri ’ s governments between 1992 and 2004 , contrasting the overwhelming success of Rafik Hariri with the less successful strategies of Najib Mikati and Issam Fares . The third section looks at the dynamics since 2005 . Saad Hariri monopolized Sunni politics to an unprecedented degree . This is a considerable problem for Mikati ’ s government . However , the power struggle between the two billionaires obscures the significant interests they share .
The Rise of the New Business elite in Lebanese politics
The dominance of businessmen in Lebanese politics is not new . The commercial-financial bourgeoisie of the pre-war era was central to the formation of the country ’ s state and economy . The National Pact of 1943 , which formalized the confessional power-sharing political system , can be seen as a compromise between the Maronite and Sunni business elites . 4 The former dominated trade with Europe and the USA , while the latter had strong relations with the Arab Gulf . Despite opposing nationalist ideas among the two communities , their bourgeois families reached a confessional compromise which made the Lebanese state a vehicle for the appropriation of rent from financial intermediation between Arab East and Western financial markets and from entrepot trade entering the Arab market via Lebanon . The economic and political elites of the country remained so closely intertwined as to be virtually congruent as most zuama – the political leaders of the pre-war era -hailed from a few dozen bourgeois families . 5 This network of families maintained Lebanon ’ s laissez-faire economic system . The increasingly illiberal economic environment in “ revolutionary ” Arab states and the underdeveloped banking systems in the Gulf allowed Lebanese bankers and traders to act as intermediaries between the Arab world and the global economy . The dominance of Lebanon ’ s business families came under attack in the 1960s and 1970s . President Fuad Chehab ( 1958-1964 ) expanded the developmental role of the state and undermined the bourgeoisie ’ s economic power and their political power , based largely on maintaining confessional clientele . Furthermore , the social crisis arising from Lebanon ’ s
4
Michael Johnson , Clan and Client in Beirut : The Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanon State 1840-1985 ( London : Ithaca Press , 1986 ), 25-26 .
5
Hrair Dekmejian , Patterns of Political Leadership : Egypt , Israel , Lebanon ( New York : State University of New York Press , 1975 ), 22-23 ; Fawwaz Traboulsi , A History of Modern Lebanon ( London : Pluto Press , 2007 ), 115 . 6