LILIT HARUTYUNYAN
Hariri business empire has a large stake in Lebanese banking , construction and media . Rafik Hariri started building up a popular following in the mid- 1990s and his son turned this “ movement ” into a coherent organization . Sunni businessman Najib Mikati acted as minister of public works and transport from 1998 to 2004 , headed the Lebanese government in 2005 , and was appointed prime minister again in January 2011 . His company , Cellis , held a mobile phone operating license from 1994 to 2002 . He has also built up a popular following through clientelism , but he cannot nearly match Rafik Hariri ’ s ability to mobilize . Finally , the Greek Orthodox businessman Issam Fares served as deputy prime minister from 2000 to 2005 . He has business interests in the media and used to own a Lebanese bank . He also engages in philanthropy but has been unable to mobilize a significant popular following .
This paper examines three dimensions of similarities and differences between these businessmen-politicians . The first is their pursuit of collective economic and individual business interests . All members of the new business elite support a neoliberal transformation of the economy in order to create larger investment opportunities for the private sector . Such reforms are not politically neutral and aim to strengthen the power of the capitalist classes . 2 Furthermore , “ neoliberal reforms are often accompanied by cronyism and rent-seeking through privatized monopolies , where “ networks of privilege ” shape markets to their advantage ”. 3 The new contractors therefore also compete with each other for contracts and the chance to snatch up privatized state enterprises and control market-regulating agencies . The second dimension is international politics . Due to the “ weakness ” of the Lebanese state , Lebanese politicians seek foreign alliances in order to protect their domestic “ standing ”. The choice of foreign allies and the strength of support the businessman-politician receives is a major determinant of political success . Rafik Hariri ’ s relatively greater success is best explained in the context of his strong backing from the Saudi monarchy . The third dimension is confessionalism and the mobilization of popular support through clientelism . The new business elite also cannot remain outside the confessional system . The power-sharing formula that allocates political office according to community shapes the horizon of political ambition for new contractors and forces them to act as representatives of “ their confessions ”, even when they pursue a wider economic agenda . Electoral success is first of all tied to mobilizing voters from the businessman ’ s own community . An important determinant of the success of a new businessman is also the “ space ” for new leaders in the politics of the confessional community . The Shia , Maronite and Druze communities emerged with
2
David Harvey , A Brief History of Neoliberalism ( Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2005 ), 19 . 3 See Steven Heydermann , Networks of Privilege in the Middle East : the Politics of Economic Reform Revisited ( New York : Palgrave Macmillan , 2004 ).
5