LILIT HARUTYUNYAN
government was tense . Both the Hariri and Hoss governments “ imposed various charges on the mobile phone companies and turned down offers to convert the ten-year BOT contracts into twenty-year operating licenses ”. 39 “ At stake were the large profits of the duopoly . In 1998 , revenue from mobile phone operations reached USD 440 million ” 40 . The sector ’ s future was endangered by a conflict between Hariri , who sought to privatize the sector , and Lahoud , who sought to allocate as much of the mobile phone profits for the state as possible . In the end , Lahoud managed to control the telecommunications ministry from 2000 to 2004 and impose his preferred solution . “ Mikati sold his stake in Cellis to France Telecom , and in December 2002 both mobile phone companies formally transferred their assets to the state ”. 41 Mikati is not completely reliant on income from within Lebanon . However , his investment company M1 Group 42 owns New York and London real estate , the French fashion company Faconnable and interests in oil exploration in Colombia . Hariri also eclipsed Mikati in the size of his popular following . Mikati had built up a philanthropic association that could act as an instrument of patronage during elections . He first entered parliament as a deputy for Tripoli in 2000 on the list of the Maronite zaim Suleiman Frangieh , while Hariri refrained from fielding his own candidates in the constituency , probably as a result of pressure from Syria . 43 While Mikati managed to build up a following in Tripoli , he never managed to create the national reach that Hariri and especially his son Saad enjoyed . Furthermore , while Hariri had managed to gain control of a major economic and symbolic space in Beirut – the Solidere area – Mikati never achieved such economic success in the capital .
Issam Fares was less successful than Hariri or Mikati . As a Greek Orthodox Christian , his advance to the highest state position was hindered by Michael Mur , who had supported Syria ’ s policy in Lebanon since the mid- 1980s and was one of Assad ’ s closest allies in the country . From 1992 to 2000 , he was deputy prime minister , the highest position a Greek Orthodox can occupy . Fares only managed to occupy the post from 2000 to 2004 . The post provides the holder with little power and Murr ’ s influence stemmed more from his control of the interior ministry ( 1996-2000 ), a position later held by his son Elias ( 2000-2004 ). Fares , meanwhile , was stuck with a largely ceremonial role as deputy prime minister without any control over the institutions that shaped economic policy . Fares had allied himself with Emil Lahoud , who sought to draw a wealthy businessman into his network to
39
EIU , Country Report : Lebanon , 4 , Quarter 1995 , 14 ; EIU , Country Report : Lebanon , 1 , Quarter 1996 , 14 ; EIU , Country Report : Lebanon , October 2000 .
40
International Telecommunications Union , Arab States Telecommunications Indicators 1992-2001 , Geneva : ITU , 2002 .
41
EIU , Country Report : Lebanon , July 2002 ; EIU , Country Report : Lebanon , January 2003 .
42
See Najib Mikati , https :// www . forbes . com / profile / najib-mikati /# 41041d378d63 ( Accessed May 30 , 2020 )
43
Middle East International , August , 18 , 2000 , 13 . 15