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confessional clientelism to win elections . However , there are also differences between the clientelism of the pre-war zuama and the new contractor Hariri . One difference is scale . The zuama tended to dominate in particular locations , for instance , the Salams in Beirut or the Karamis in Tripoli . Hariri managed to build up a truly national presence by spending amounts that were beyond the financial capability of the zuama . In the late 1970s , he started charitable works in his home town of Sidon but then quickly moved to provide services across the whole country through his student-loan program from 1983 to 1996 . In the parliamentary elections of 2000 , Hariri became the most prominent Sunni politician in Beirut , winning all the seats in the capital and relegating traditional Sunni Beiruti leaders to the second rank . Such complete domination in a locale other than their region of origin would have been inconceivable for a pre-war zaim . Secondly , Hariri relied primarily on his own wealth and funding from the Gulf to pay for his philanthropic ventures . In contrast , the philanthropic associations controlled by pre-war zuama were often financed collectively through donations by bourgeois families or the middle class . The zuama therefore had to be much more responsive to the interests and ideologies of these constituencies , while the new zaim Hariri was financially independent from domestic Lebanese groups . 37
The contrast between Hariri on the one hand , and Mikati and Fares on the other illustrates the conditions for success and failure of new businessmen . As a Sunni Muslim , Mikati also had ambitions to become prime minister . However , he lacked the powerful foreign sponsor that Hariri had in the form of Saudi Arabia . The warm relations that Mikati had fostered with the Syrian regime could not make up for this shortcoming . The Syrians relied much more on other types of elites - on former militia leaders such as Nabih Berri or Walid Jumblatt , on the military and intelligence establishment around Lahoud , and loyal allies such as Michel Murr . Mikati did enjoy some political success - he became minister for transport and public works under the Selim Hoss government in 1998 , after Hariri had already left office . He retained his ministerial position until 2004 . Despite the grand title , these ministries were of little use to Mikati . They had been marginalized in the reconstruction effort by the CDR , headed by a Hariri loyalist for most of the time between 1991 and 2005 . Mikati ’ s main interest was in telecommunications . In 1994 , Cellis had won a ‘ build-operate-transfer ’ ( BOT ) project . One-third of the company was owned by Najib and Taha Mikati , France Telecom owned the rest . 38 However , Mikati had no direct control of the institutions in charge of telecommunications . The second most popular mobile phone operator was Libancell . Their relationship with the
37
See Hannes Baumann , “ The ascent of Rafiq Hariri and Sunni philanthropy ”, 81-106
38
Economist Intelligence Unit ( EIU ), Country Report : Lebanon , July 2002 . https :// www . iuj . ac . jp / mlic / EIU / Report / Lebanon / July _ 2002 _ Main _ report . pdf ( Accessed May 30 , 2020 ). 14