CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VIII (1) ContemporaryEurasia81 | Page 53

MAXIMILIAN OHLE, RICHARD J. COOK, ZHAOYING HAN & RYSBEK MAMAZHANOV
dominant’s apparatus after signaling a commitment to the bargain. 31 The
signal marks the initial assentation and/or periodically reinforces the social
contract.
Due to Kyrgyzstan’s traditional conformity to Russian domination, the
arrival of China’s push into the region with their own hierarchical package
has installed an ability to delicately hedge, specifically aiming to acquire
better economic benefits. However, Bishkek is aware that shifting or
defecting from one dominant to another ‘totally’, may destabilise its position
with the Moscow, something that may result in punishment, which Moscow
has periodically carried out. Furthermore, maintaining alignment with Russia
in both the CSTO and EAEU aids the balance of hierarchy and allows
Bishkek to become a key land-linking actor. 32 Despite the hedging
opportunities, Kyrgyzstan, as the most democratic state in the region,
remains apprehensive towards the autocratic features of both Eurasian
giants. Memories of the territorial settlements with China and the Tulip
Revolution are fresh and recent notions of debt trap diplomacy under the
BRI are a cause for concern. 33
The Orchestration of a Hierarchical Dual-Architecture
The Security Domain: The CSTO and the SCO
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31
Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In”,
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1994): 72-107; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of
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Jervis, “Logics of Mind and International System: A Journey with Robert Jervis”, Review of
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32
Zhenis Kembayev, “Implementing the Silk Road and the Economic Belt. From the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to the Silk Road Union?”, Asia Europe Journal, Vol. 16,
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33
Sebastian Peyrouse, “China and Central Asia”, in The New Great Game. China and South
and Central Asia in the Era of Reform ed. Thomas Fingar (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2016), 216-239; Sam Parker and Gabrielle Chefitz, “China’s Debtbook Diplomacy:
How China is Turning Bad Loans into Strategic Investments”, The Diplomat, May 30, 2018,
https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/chinas-debtbook-diplomacy-how-china-is-turning-bad-
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