CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VIII (1) ContemporaryEurasia81 | Page 29

LEVON HOVSEPYAN
army, when it is deprived of its systemic levers and its role. The society and
the ruling party gradually nurture the army by their ideology and value
preferences, in an attempt to bring it to their own ideological field.
Ü. C. Sakallioğlu observes that non-democratic regimes, in the context
of civil-military relations, as a rule, tend to subject themselves to the military
elite, and although civilian control over the army is exercised by civilians, it
is not always democratic. The Erdoğan-model of civil-military relations is
more like the one-party regime of the Turkish Republic in the 1920-30s, 28
when together with the ruling party and the state apparatus there was a
coalescence of the supreme command of the army and the political elite, and
the army was the protector and the pillar of the regime. Large-scale
reshuffles undertaken by the Turkish government in the army and defense
since the July 15 coup attempt widely opened the door for Erdoğan to
establish direct control over the General Staff and power agencies, as well as
to transform the army into his own power source. 29 Such a statement
becomes more convincing in the case of a change in the governing system of
the country and transition to the presidential system, which heralds a return
to the civil-military power relations to the model of the 30-40s of the
previous century.
The Turkish President's decrees of July 15, 2018, made serious
changes to the defense system, which was the logical continuation of the
transformations that took place in 2016. Particularly, the General Staff, as
well as the commanders of the three main military units, were attached to the
NDM. A number of civilian members of the Supreme Military Council
(YAŞ) were also added and the NSC General-secretariat was attached to the
president. 30 The unprecedented powers and levers given to the president by
the Constitution within the framework of the transition to the presidential
system enable total control over the armed forces. According to one of the
decrees, the President of the country can issue orders to the Chief of the
General Staff and Commanders of the Army, which, without the approval of
any state institution, should be immediately implemented. One Turkish
journalist qualified that decree as a victory proving supremacy over the
28
Ümit Cizre, “Turkey in a Tailspin, The Foiled Coup Attempt of July 15”, Middle East
Report, August 10, 2016, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero081016 (accessed September 1,
2016).
29
Ibid.
30
“Bakanlıklara Bağlı, İlgili, İlişkili Kurum ve Kuruluşlar ile Diğer Kurum ve Kuruluşların
Teşkilatı Hakkında Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kararnamesi” (Kararname Numarası: 4), “Yüksek
Askeri Şûranın Kuruluş ve Görevleri Hakkında Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kararnamesi” (Kararname
Numarası: 8), “Millî Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliğinin Teşkilat ve Görevleri Hakkında
Cumhurbaşkanlığı
Kararnamesi”
(Kararname
Numarası:
6),
Resmi
Gazetet,
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/
07/20180715.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/07/20180715.htm
(accessed December 20, 2018).
29