CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VIII (1) ContemporaryEurasia81 | Page 27

LEVON HOVSEPYAN
$3 billion. Due to OYAK's existence, the TAF has been characterized as
“a large industrial and economic entrepreneur” in the country for many
years. 21 In May 2016, OYAK's governing board’s chairman, O. Özbahadır,
and General Director, C. Ulusoy, unexpectedly resigned. S. Erdem, who
worked during Erdoğan's premiership as well as in his presidential
administration, was appointed to be the new head of this organization. The
Turkish media qualified these reshufflings as “a step towards the AKP's self-
control over the OYAK and an attempt to remove it from the army”, noting
that the army's era ended in that structure. The AKP's era is being launched
instead. 22 OYAK has always been a factor in the socio-economic self-
sufficiency of the army, under the strict control of the military, where the
entry of unwanted civilians was banned. OYAK personnel changes sparked
questions about the secret agenda of the AKP, which not only falls under the
control of civilian authorities, but directly moves under Erdoğan's control. 23
The legislative and structural changes aimed at reducing the political
role of the army through the years have essentially affected the role of the
latter as an autonomous and self-sufficient institution. In Republican Turkey,
the army had a special "veto" right in the political system when it nurtured
society and the bureaucratic apparatus and imposed its values, thus making
the military hegemonic and dominant in the political system. 24 Reforms on
the establishment of civilian control over the army and the reduction of its
political role scaled down the role of the army as an autonomous institution,
which changed the essence of the civil-military relations.
Apart from systemic changes, social-value processes that affect the
transformation of the latter's institutional identity are also crucial. The army
as a social system also carries the influence of the social processes that affect
the collective identity of the army. Taking into account the traditions of the
civil-military relationship and the role of the army, it should be noted that
despite the fact that legislative and institutional reforms in the sector
significantly contributed to the weakening of the role of the army, non-
21
Arsen Avagyan, “Banaky dery Turkiayi tntesakan hamakargum”, Haykakan banak, 4 (50),
(2016), in Armenian,
(“The Role of the Army in the Turkish Economic System”, Armenian Army, 4 (50), Yerevan,
2006).
22
Metin Münir, “OYAK’ta ordu dönemi bitti, AKP dönemi başladı”, T24, May 26, 2016,
http://t24.com.tr/yazarlar/metin-munir/oyakta-ordu-donemi-bitti-akp-donemi-basladi,14641
(accessed May 26, 2016); Şehriban Kıraç, “AKP, OYAK'ı böyle ele geçirdi”, Cumhuriyet,
June
12,
2016,
http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/549749/AKP OYAK_i_boyle_ele_gecirdi.html
(accessed June 13, 2016).
23
Metin Gurcan, “OYAK’ta rutin görev değişimi mi yoksa sivil darbe mi?”, Al-Monitor, May
31,
2016,
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/originals/2016/05/turkey-civilian-coup-
military-owned-enterprise-oyak.html#ixzz4a1CRtfjy (accessed June 2, 2016).
24
Metın Gurcan and Megan Gisclon, “From Autonomy to Full-Fledged Civilian Control: The
Changing Nature of Turkish Civil-Military Relations”, IPC-Mercator Policy Brief, ( August
2016): 15.
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