CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VII (1, 2) Contemporary-Eurasia-3new | Page 82

CONTEMPORARY EURASIA
lims could practice their faith in their own houses of worship and were
exempted from the bans of alcohol and pork”. 7 Qatar has sought to devel-
op the soft power need to compensate for its inability to ensure its secu-
rity militarily. Qatar calls into question the Saudi version of Wahhabism
thereby challenging Riyadh’s internal and foreign policy.
Qatar’s regional power aspirations.
Support for the Muslim Brotherhood
It is noteworthy that Qatar was largely involved in provoking and
promoting the Arab Spring processes, which resulted in the removal of
several Arab regimes from power. “Qatar’s political stability, economic
wealth, ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, and international reputation as
a mediator gave it the confi dence to take an intervention role during the
Arab Spring”. 8 The political establishment backed oppositional Islamist
political forces in transitioning countries and led the regional response
to upheaval in several countries like Syria for seeking Arab solutions to
Arab problems. According to certain information, the Arab Spring pro-
cesses were prepared by US research-analytical centers based in Qatar
and afterward launched with the support of the ruling family. 9
Doha intended, with the help of Turkey, to bring the Muslim Brother-
hood to power in the Arab countries; in such a case, Qatar’s role would
increase within the political and economic processes of Arab countries.
It is no coincidence that since 2012, within the Arab Spring period, the
Palestinian Hamas branch began operating in Qatar, which was directly
linked to and sponsored by the Muslim Brotherhood and which had been
based in Damascus before.
In the same period, the Muslim Brotherhood movement led by Mo-
hamed Morsi came to power in Egypt. Shortly after, on July 3, 2013, Morsi
was deprived of power by the military and was imprisoned. In 2013, Sau-
di rulers threw their weight behind Egypt’s brutal crackdown on Muslim
Brotherhood supporters. In March 2014, Saudi Arabia designated Muslim
Brotherhood a “terrorist” group. A brand of Sunni Islamism that called for
7
8
9
James M. Dorsey, “Qatari Wahhabism vs Saudi Wahhabism and the perils of top-down
change,” BESA Center Perspectives, Paper No. 676, December 7, 2017, https://besacenter.
org/perspectives-papers/qatar-saudi-arabia-wahhabism/ (accessed June 5, 2018); James M.
Dorsey, “Wahhabism vs. Wahhabism. Qatar challenges Saudi Arabia,” RSIS, No. 262, Sep-
tember 06, 2013, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/rsis-pubs/WP262.pdf (ac-
cessed June 5, 2018)
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Qatar and the Arab Spring. Policy Drivers and Regional Impli-
cations,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September, 2014, https://carnegieen-
dowment.org/fi les/Brief-Ulrichsen_Qatar.pdf (accessed May 7, 2018).
А. I. Alexandrov, “Qatar i Saudovskaya Araviya”.
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