CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VII (1, 2) Contemporary-Eurasia-3new | Page 81

ARAKS PASHAYAN
Introduction
On November 23, 2013, the fi nal declaration adopted at the Coop-
eration Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) called on Qatar
not to support those forces that were pursuing explosive activity in the
Arab world, referring to the de-facto and lasting support of Qatar for the
Muslim Brotherhood movement. It was considered that if Qatar contin-
ued supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, the United States also would
close its airspace for Qatar Airways, and at GCC and the League of Arab
States the issue of suspension of Qatar’s membership would be raised. 3
Despite Qatar’s numerous assurances of fraternity and friendship, in par-
ticular between the ruling families of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, there were
many acute and lingering issues, including border-related ones. In 1965
a demarcation agreement was signed between the two states, however,
in early October 1992, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia occupied al-Kho-
fous, a border post with Qatar. 4 In 1995, when Qatar’s Emir Tamim’s fa-
ther Hamad Al Thani (1995-2013) came to power as a result of a palace
coup, Qatar accused Saudi Arabia of meddling in the internal aff airs of its
country. Several hundred infl uential representatives of the Qatari Al Mur-
rah tribe were deprived of citizenship and expelled from the country. 5 In
2002, an indignant Saudi leadership, furious at Al Jazeera for providing
a platform for the kingdom’s dissidents, withdrew its ambassador from
Doha in a diplomatic spat that lasted fi ve years. 6
Тhereby, the Qatar-Gulf confrontation demonstrates beyond doubt of
long-running family rivalries behind the crisis. The rulers have familiar
relationship. The issues are personal. Both the Thanis and Sauds originate
from the peninsula’s Nejd interior, the homeland of Wahhabism. Both
Saudi Arabia and Qatar seek to claim their version of Wahhabism is the
right path adopting diff erent approaches to this ultra-conservative form
of Sunni Islam. “Qatari conservatism was everything but a mirror image
of Saudi Arabia’s long-standing puritan way of life. Qatar did not have a
powerful religious establishment that could enforce ultra-conservative so-
cial norms, nor did it implement absolute gender segregation. Non-Mus-
3
4
5
6
A. I. Alexandrov, “Qatar i Saudovskaya Araviya: otnosheniya obostryayutsya,” (in Russian),
[“Qatar – Saudi Arabia relations have been strained.”], Insitute of the Middle East, Маrch 11,
2014, http://www.iimes.ru/?p=20224, (accessed July 27, 2018).
“Qatar Says Saudis Seized Its Border Post,” New York Times, October 2, 1992, https://www.
nytimes.com/1992/10/02/world/qatar-says-saudis-seized-its-border-post.html, (accessed May
7, 2018).
“The long-running family rivalries behind the Qatar crisis,” The Guardian, July 21, 2017,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/21/qatar-crisis-may-be-rooted-in-old-family-ri-
valries, (accessed May 15, 2018)
“What is the Muslim Brotherhood,” Al Jazeera, June 18, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/
indepth/features/2017/06/muslim-brotherhood-explained-170608091709865.html (accessed
July 2, 2018)
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