CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VIII (2) ContEurVIII2 | Page 68

CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VIII (2)
policies were intended to deepen energy relations with the region.
Meanwhile, these efforts could imply little or cause very limited harm to
China’s global interests. 13
The most illustrative example of this case is the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict. In regard to its oil demands, needs, and sustainable supplies
from the Middle East region, Beijing sympathized with the Arab world
and supported the Palestinians. Furthermore, in 2003, at the request of
Saudi Arabia, China made an announcement for stopping violence in the
Middle East and called the parties to seek a peaceful resolution to the
Arab-Israeli conflict. It criticized Israeli actions against Palestine, Syria,
and Lebanon. China supported ‘a land for peace’ initiative, as well as the
‘nuclear-free Middle East’ principles. Thus, expanding multilateral ties
with the Arab world became crucial for Chinese policymakers and
strategists in accordance with Beijing’s future energy calculations.
China’s 2003 stance on the Middle East was once again affirmed during
the China-Arab League biennial forum on politics and economy in
September 2004. 14
Chinese economic drive made Beijing’s foreign policymakers put
forward some basic objectives regarding Sino-Arab relations. Overall, the
main goals of Beijing’s policy could be viewed as the following:
 Beijing’s most important foreign policy objective was the
international recognition of Communist China as the sole legitimate
government. The acceptance of this fact by the Arabs was of particular
importance for China;
 Use the potential of the Arab world as a significant revolutionary
arena against the Western powers;
 Get Arab support for Communist China’s policy and create better
conditions for further development;
 Get Arab support for strengthening China’s position among the
Afro-Asian nations. 15
Beijing’s engagement and its energy-driven initiatives in the
Middle East were generally well received. Simultaneously, China’s steps
were responded to positively by the two major Gulf players, Iran and
Saudi Arabia. In the case of Iran, the strategic and political advantages of
establishing closer ties with China seemed obvious. As Tehran came
under increasing pressure over its nuclear activities, especially by

13 Lai,
“China’s Oil Diplomacy,” 530.
Ibid.
15 Joseph E. Khalili, “Sino-Arab relations,” Asian Survey, Vol. 8 (8), 1968, 679.
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