CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VIII (2) ContEurVIII2 | Page 67

ARAM ABAJYAN
resources of other Middle Eastern countries. The oil of Saudi Arabia and
Iran seemed especially promising and attractive. 10
Beijing supported all the efforts of China’s energy companies to
win deals in the Gulf region and mutual official high-level visits were
continuing. Besides energy cooperation, Sino-Gulf relations were
developing in other spheres as well. Following up on its expanding
network of energy deals with the region, China was gradually becoming a
more significant exporter of manufactured goods and capital to the Gulf
region. In 2002, by the time Hu Jintao became the General Secretary of
China’s Communist Party, Beijing adopted a ‘going out’ ( 走出去 , zou chu
qu) policy in accordance with its rising energy demands. The main
purpose of this new policy was to encourage its national three major oil
companies to set up certain and constant supplies abroad through
purchasing equity shares in foreign markets, exploring and drilling for
oil, as well as construct new refineries. Beijing also initiated the
construction of pipelines to Siberia and Central Asia. 11
Nevertheless, in spite of the ‘greedy appetite’ of China’s factories
and vehicles to gain more and more hydrocarbons, the possible cause of
Beijing’s adoption of the ‘going out’ strategy was the country’s confusion
about the coming war in Iraq, as well as the vagueness surrounding the
US position towards China regarding armed struggle over Taiwan. Thus,
the key demands of this strategy led Beijing to involve the Middle East
more deeply, expanding relations with the energy-producing countries of
the region. Chinese energy companies were pursuing deals in many
regions, but the Gulf region along with its huge oil potential was crucially
important for Beijing, thus the region gradually regained its significant
status for China’s calculations. During the first period, Chinese leaders
hoped to meet China’s growing demands for oil and gas with the help of
geographically closer states, particularly Russia and Central Asian
countries. As a result, these hopes have not yet been realized, and these
countries could not replace the Gulf region. In general, the Middle East
region provided about 60 percent of China’s oil in 2005. Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Oman, Yemen, and Sudan were the major suppliers. By 2010, the
percentage of China’s oil imports from the region grew to 80 percent. 12
Since the oil-rich Middle East had become so significant for China,
it started to implement various policies and approaches for sympathizing
with these nations over their disturbing issues. Indeed, Beijing’s such

10 Leverett
and Bader, “Managing China-U.S.,” 190.
Ibid, 193.
12 Ibid, 194.
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