CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VIII (2) ContEurVIII2 | Page 37
CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VIII (2)
political views regarding the Abkhaz and South Ossetian problems, as
well as inforeign policy. In January 2019, the Prime Minister of Georgia,
Mamuka Bakhtadze, told the American CNBC that the Russian
“occupation of 20% of the Georgian territory” is the greatest challenge
for Georgia. 74 In its turn, Russia is still greatly concerned with Georgia’s
Euro-Atlantic aspirations, yet the latter does not intend to make a shift in
its foreign policy course because of the fear of public backlash. In its
foreign policy strategy for 2019-2022 (adopted in March 2019), two of
the five main priorities noted are security and territorial integrity, as well
as EU and NATO integration. 75
After the change in government in Armenia in May 2018 as a
result of a few weeks of peaceful protests and the former opposition
leader, Nikol Pashinyan, was elected PM, it was still uncertain whether
Yerevan would change its foreign policy vector and pursue integration
into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Before coming to power, the current
Armenian PM was an ardent critic of enhancing relations with Russia and
participating in Russia-led organizations, especially EAEU. Hence, there
was a notion that the Armenian-Russian relationship might change
dramatically. However, both during the protests and after taking office,
Pashinyan has always ensured his Russian counterparts that he is going to
stay committed to Armenia’s foreign policy priorities and does not intend
to leave EAEU, CSTO, or CIS. Some experts are of the opinion that
Pashinyan’s stance is determined by the unresolved conflict of Nagorno
Karabakh and the closed border with Turkey. In this sense, cooperation with
Russia provides more security alternatives for Armenia rather than the
West, in addition to Armenia’s dependency on Russia as its major trading
partner and investor in the Armenian economy. 7677 Simultaneously,
74 Holly
Elyatt, “Russia is Still Occupying 20% of Our Country, Georgia's Prime Minister
Says”, CNBC, January 22, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/22/russia-is-still-
occupying-20percent-of-our-country-georgias-leader-says.html.
75 “Georgian Government Adopts Foreign Policy Strategy for 2019-2022”,The Caucasus
Watch, April 2, 2019,
http://caucasuswatch.de/news/1458.html?fbclid=IwAR1xwuliWFIns24vPfcYtNWNRhYh
BQOBkfD3oslY54r1EoHIaSXyIFJNXi4.
76 Alexander Markarov, “Armenia’s Foreign Policy Priorities. Are There Any Major
Changes Following the Spring 2018 Political Transformation?”,Caucasus Analytical
Digest,
no.
104
(2018):
3-7,
https://www.laender-analysen.de/cad/pdf/
CaucasusAnalyticalDigest104.pdf.
77 Amanda Paul, &Dennis Sammut, “Armenia’s ‘Velvet Revolution’: Time is Pashinyan’s
worst
enemy”.
European
Policy
Center,
May
30,
2018,
37