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MANE BABAJANYAN affect Armenian-Georgian relations and to analyze to what extent those factors can be regarded as challenges. The method is mainly qualitative. Secondary data is collected from the media sources that cover recent developments. The first part is generally based on the existing academic literature. The second part, called “Analysis,” is aimed at filling in the gaps of the literature through primary data. Four interviews were conducted with a questionnaire designed on the basis of secondary data. First, an expert on Armenian- Georgian relations answered several questions concerning different aspects of bilateral relations. Second, representatives of three Armenian cargo transportation companies were interviewed. The interviewees were chosen based on purposive sampling. Foreign Policy Vectors Unlike Saakashvili’s administration, the policies of today’s Georgian government are rather cautious in order to avoid antagonizing Russia. Despite the absence of diplomatic relations, the political elites of the two states maintain constant communication. Measures have been undertaken to activate the trade and transportation channels between the two countries 71 . In 2011, Georgia reached an agreement with a Swiss company named "Société Générale de Surveillance" (SGS) that provides for the establishment of three trade corridors between Georgia and Russia. Two of these corridors run through Abkhazia and South Ossetia, under SGS monitoring (Switzerland acts as mediator since diplomatic relations were broken off in 2008) 72 . Finally, in 2018, Russia also signed a contract with SGS as a condition for its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) that had been previously vetoed by Georgia. 73 However, despite cooperation between Russia and Georgia in the economic sphere, the two countries still hold fundamentally opposing                                                              71 “Pragmatic but Principled: Georgia Opts for Less Confrontation with Russia And the EU is Happy with That”, The Economist, January 11, 2018, https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/01/11/georgia-opts-for-less-confrontation-with- russia. 72 “Georgia’s Contract with Swiss Company Ensures Implementation of 2011 Russia- Georgia Cargo Traffic Deal,” Agenda.ge, December 21, 2017, http://agenda.ge/en/news/2017/2793. 73 Giorgi Menabde, “Abkhazia and South Ossetia ‘Block’ Transit Agreement Between Russia and Georgia”, The Jamestown Foundation, February 22, 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/abkhazia-and-south-ossetia-block-transit-agreement- between-russia-and-georgia/. 36