Climate Change: Considerations for Geographic Combatant Commands PKSOI Paper | Page 19

seaports from a regional economic perspective.31 Taylor et. al., provides one of the most comprehensive assessments of expected impacts in the Caribbean along
with suggestions for adaptation responses—one illustrative adaptation example is “increase water storage
capacity to mitigate the effects of drought.”32 In addition to Taylor’s Caribbean-specific review, the recent
2014 IPCC report, and the 2014 USGCRP report, several recent scholarly works address the relationship
between climate change and security [Nordas and
Gleditsch 2007; Raleigh and Urdal 2007; Campbell et
al. 2007; Hsiang et al. 2013; Kelley 2014].33 One example is Kelley’s discussion of the relationship of Syria’s persistent drought as a contributory factor to the
popular uprising and Civil War that began in 2011.34
DoD’s CCAR organizes into four areas “high-level potential effects of climate change: Plans & Operations,
Training & Testing, Built & Natural Infrastructure,
and Acquisition & Supply Chain.”35 Together, these
impact assessments provide useful context for future
SOUTHCOM theater estimates and they inform possible inclusion of climate change security implications
in the GCC’s theater campaign plan risk assessment,
science and technology (S&T) priorities, and the Integrated Priority List (IPL). This IPL communicated
from the Commander, SOUTHCOM to the Chairmen
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff could be used to create a
“demand signal” for joint engineer forces or contract
capacity to address high-risk infrastructure in need of
adaptation to account for sea level rise impacts.36 The
DoD CCAR provides a useful framework for a GCC to
categorize mission-relevant risks within their theater
estimates.

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