China Policy Journal Volume 1, Number 2, Fall 2019 | Page 24

Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks’ Policy Influence
meetings as a straightforward certification
of its research capacity and influence,
so the data of meeting is easy to
be observed.
4.1 The Significance of CIIS and SIIS
Meetings in Their Policy Influence
Among many ways and means employed
by CIIS and SIIS to push their
policy influences, meeting may be the
most special one because it can reveal
the structural characteristics and operating
dynamic of China’s “field of power”
in a most concise way through its
functions. Specifically speaking, it has
three major functions:
(1) Platforms for Exchanges of
Policy-Related Information and Resources.
As Figure 1 indicates, Chinese
think tanks, including CIIS and SIIS,
form a “central space” between four
subfields of China’s “field of power.”
The participants of CIIS and SIIS meetings
are elites of China’s foreign policy
community within the four subfields,
and particularly from politics and academia.
So, CIIS and SIIS meetings can
act as a regular and concentrated platform
facilitating and propelling the direct
or indirect exchanges of resources
and information between these actors.
(2) Channels for Transmitting
Concerns and Requests of Domestic
Social Groups to Policymakers. As China
is deeply integrated to the world, the
vital interests of various domestic social
groups are increasingly impacted or
even shaped by foreign policy, so they
become more and more concerned with
foreign policy issues. So far China has
not established an open and institutionalized
system of political lobbying and
interest group politics, but think tank
meetings on some important occasions
may offer channels for some social
groups to let their voices be heard by
high-level policymakers and their interest
requests and concerns communicated
to political leaders. As Tables 3–5
reveal, Chinese business interests have
become more actively involved in CIIS
and SIIS meetings than previously, because
they can directly talk to high-level
officials or even top leaders about
their concerns, requests, and opinions
on these meetings.
(3) Hub of Networking. Many
meetings of CIIS and SIIS have become
institutionalized as a kind of mechanism
to regularly connect different
sectors of China’s foreign policy community.
Large-scaled annual forums
and workshop programs operate as networks
and platforms to connect actors
of the whole foreign policy community,
particularly those from important business
interests, academic institutions,
and even nongovernmental advocacy
groups, while small-scaled lecture
meetings and bilateral meetings may
help to drive the more exclusive networks
between CIIS, SIIS, and government
leaderships.
Therefore, through an observation
and calculation of the frequencies
of various forms of meetings, and the
composition of the types of participants
of these meetings, not only is it probable
to distinguish the closeness of CIIS
and SIIS’s connections to each subfield
of China’s “field of power,” and therefore
clarify their differentiated positions
within China’s foreign policymaking
15