China Policy Journal Volume 1, Number 2, Fall 2019 | 页面 17

China Policy Journal
ture attracts both Chinese and western
scholars. Since late 1960s, U.S. experts
of Chinese studies already noticed the
vertical–horizontal crossing of executive
command chains, and interpreted
this feature as “dual rule” (Schurmann
1973) or “honeycomb model” (Shue
1988).
(3) The Elitist versus Pluralist
Participation in Policy Process. As
China’s reform and opening is pushing
forward step by step, a variety of social
groups and interests are entering the
arena of China’s overall policy process
to present their requests and promote
their interests. Think tanks are one of
the diversity of emerging voices. This
pluralizing trend is captured by scholars
in their works (Fewsmith 1996;
Lampton 2002; Glaser 2010; Mertha
2009; Shue 1988;).
(4) The Impact from China’s
Nomenklatura System on Policymaking.
China may not have a mature “revolving
door” mechanism as institutionalized
as that in the United States,
but there does exists a system of human
resource exchanges that plays a role in
shaping China’s policymaking. That is
the “nomenklatura” system of Chinese
style. Scholars’ analyses of this system
reveal some structural features of bureaucratic
ways of information gathering
and resource exchanges in China’s
policymaking system (Fewsmith 1996;
Glaser 2010; Harding 1981; Huang
1996; Lu 1997;).
3. Guiding Theoretical
Paradigm and Analytical
Framework
3.1 The Guiding
Theoretical Paradigm
The conceptual frameworks of current
literature on think tanks are largely
based on the idea of “social space” and
“field of power” proposed by French
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. He argued
that highly interactive social actors of
a political system create a kind of “social
space,” within which these actors
exchange social capital with each other
and form many networks. These net-
low-central-level governmental institutions (including government-affiliated think tanks) in policymaking
and executive operations. For a provincial-level government institution (including provincial
government-affiliated think tank), vertical commanding lines extend from the central-level
ministries of the State Council or central party apparatus to this institution, transmitting central-level
guidance on how to operate its professional work, while horizontal commanding lines
extend from provincial party committee and government leadership to that institution and mostly
transfer administrative directives on funding, personnel affairs, and some part of professional
work. For example, the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS) is under both a direct
control from the Shanghai Municipal Government and a strong guidance from China’s Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MOF). (The Shanghai Municipality is a provincial-level unit.) The Shanghai
Municipal Government appropriates funds to SIIS annually, determines its personnel appointment
affairs, and occasionally gives directives on specific issues related to its research work (termed as
“horizontal leadership” in Chinese bureaucratic jargon), while the MOF issues most of the guidance
on its research work (termed as “vertical leadership” in Chinese bureaucratic jargon). In the
bureaucratic organizational chart, the SIIS is both a subsidiary of the Shanghai Municipal Government
with an administrative bureaucratic rank of “bureau” and a knot on a line extending from the
top-level pivotal juncture of the MOF in Beijing.
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