China Policy Journal Volume 1, Number 2, Fall 2019 | Page 16

Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks’ Policy Influence
2002). Some of them summarized these
connections into five major types: family
links, common school ties, teacher–
student relations, common geographic
origins and working relations (Glaser
and Saunders 2002; Glaser 2012; Liao
2006; Zhao 2012). Also, some of them
conduct their analyses within more
general frameworks of elite and informal
politics (Dittmer 1995; Jakobson
2010; Nathan 2003; Paltiel 2010;
Fewsmith, 1996; Shambaugh 2001).
There were also some descriptions of a
Chinese style “revolving door” mechanism
(Li 2002).
2.2 The Literature on China’s
Policymaking and Related
Political Regime
It should be pointed out that research of
Chinese think tanks can never be alienated
from more macroscopic research
of China’s overall policymaking system
within its political regime; otherwise,
it may be very difficult to clarify the
mechanism as well as the effectiveness
of their policy influence. Already there
is a large body of literature, mostly written
by western and overseas Chinese
scholars, on China’s overall policymaking
system and political regime. This literature
can be divided into four categories
through the lens of their analytical
frameworks.
(1) The Power Centralization
versus Decentralization Dichotomy.
On the one hand, some scholars approach
their topics through the perspective
of theories of authoritarianism,
underlining the elements of
3 “Dual Leadership” refers to the crossing of both vertical and horizontal commanding lines on bepower
centralization in China’s political
regime. The most influential idea
proposed by them may be the concept
of “fragmented authoritarianism,”
which elaborates the complexity of internal
bargaining and deals that make
the overall system appear to be authoritarian
but fragmented (Lieberthal and
Oksenberg 1988; Mertha 2009). In addition,
some of them raised the ideas
of “consultative authoritarianism”
(Harding 1986), or “consultative Leninism”
(Tsang 2009). On the other
hand, other scholars deal with their issues
from the perspective of theories
of federalism, more assertively stressing
the collaborative aspects of China’s
political regime. They coined the terms
of “de facto federalism” (Zheng 2007),
“informal federalism” (Segal 1994), or
“Federalism, Chinese style” (Montinola,
Qian, and Weingast 1995).
(2) The Central–Local Gaming
in China’s National Policy Process.
The central–local relationship is particularly
complex and fluid in such a huge
polity as China. It is embedded in a vertical–horizontal
gridlock of command
and control chains over below-central-level
government institutions, with
the command chains originating from
central ministerial leadership termed as
“vertical line” and the directives flowing
from below-central-level party committee
or government leadership to specific
institutions of the same level defined as
“horizontal line.” Particularly, there is
a “dual leadership” over Chinese governmental
institutions, including most
foreign policy think tanks. 3 This fea-
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