BUSI 620 MENTOR It's Your Life/busi620mentor.com BUSI 620 MENTOR It's Your Life/busi620mentor.com | Page 32
a ) Discussion Questions : 12 and 13 . b ) Problems : 2 , 6 , and 10 .
DQ11 : Do the duopolists in a Cournot equilibrium face a prisoners ’ dilemma ? Explain .
Discussion Question 12 : How did the 1971 law that banned cigarette advertising on television solve the prisoners ’ dilemma for cigarette producers ?
Discussion Question 13 : ( a ) What is the meaning of tit-fortat in game theory ? ( b ) What conditions are usually required for tit-for-tat strategy to be the best strategy ?
Problem 2 : From the following payoff matrix , where the payoffs are the profits or losses of the two firsts , determine ( a ) whether firm A has a dominant strategy , ( b ) whether firm B has a dominant strategy , ( c ) the optimal strategy for each firm , and ( d ) the Nash equilibrium , if there is one .
Problem 6 : Explain why the payoff matrix in problem 1 indicates that firms A and B faces the prisoner ’ s dilemma
Problem 10 : Given the following payoff matrix , ( a ) indicate the best strategy for each firm . ( b ) Why is the entrydeterrent threat by firm A to lower the price credible to B ? ( c ) What could firm A do to make its threat credible without building excess capacity ?
Froeb and McCann ' s Chapter 15 :
a ) Discussion Questions : 12 and 13 . b ) Problems : 2 , 6 , and 10 .
DQ11 : Do the duopolists in a Cournot equilibrium face a prisoners ’ dilemma ? Explain .
Discussion Question 12 : How did the 1971 law that banned cigarette advertising on television solve the prisoners ’ dilemma for cigarette producers ?
Discussion Question 13 : ( a ) What is the meaning of tit-fortat in game theory ? ( b ) What conditions are usually required for tit-for-tat strategy to be the best strategy ?
Problem 2 : From the following payoff matrix , where the payoffs are the profits or losses of the two firsts , determine ( a ) whether firm A has a dominant strategy , ( b ) whether firm B has a dominant strategy , ( c ) the optimal strategy for each firm , and ( d ) the Nash equilibrium , if there is one .
Problem 6 : Explain why the payoff matrix in problem 1 indicates that firms A and B faces the prisoner ’ s dilemma
Problem 10 : Given the following payoff matrix , ( a ) indicate the best strategy for each firm . ( b ) Why is the entrydeterrent threat by firm A to lower the price credible to B ? ( c ) What could firm A do to make its threat credible without building excess capacity ?