similarly impossible to predict with any certainty what the
lay of the land will be in five hundred years. Yet these are
not shortcomings of our theory. The historical account we
have presented so far indicates that any approach based
on historical determinism—based on geography, culture, or
even other historical factors—is inadequate. Small
differences and contingency are not just part of our theory;
they are part of the shape of history.
Even if making precise predictions about which societies
will prosper relative to others is difficult, we have seen
throughout the book that our theory explains the broad
differences in the prosperity and poverty of nations around
the world fairly well. We will see in the rest of this chapter
that it also provides some guidelines as to what types of
societies are more likely to achieve economic growth over
the next several decades.
First, vicious and virtuous circles generate a lot of
persistence and sluggishness. There should be little doubt
that in fifty or even a hundred years, the United States and
Western Europe, based on