ASEBL Journal – Volume 13 Issue 1 , January 2018
istic , the agent must be perceived to properly execute the cultural rules associated with altruistic behavior or under particular circumstances . The agent sends a signal – a verbal or non-verbal communication about her tendency to help others – to those around her : she is altruistic in this circumstance , eliciting a reaction from others directly or indirectly . When a behavior is perceived to be altruistic , observers make a judgment about the agent ’ s character that may benefit her .
If altruism is viewed as a signal about one ’ s tendencies to bestow a benefit on others at a cost to oneself , intention and effect cease to be necessary criteria for behaving altruistically . An agent may send this signal inadvertently , intentionally , or deceitfully : while it may be required that she intends to act altruistically or that she has an altruistic effect , neither is necessary .
Frank ( 1988 ) argues that the conviction one holds about one ’ s honest intentions correlates positively and directly with the likelihood that others will believe one is genuine . The well-known example of tipping a waiter at a restaurant one has no intention of visiting again suggests this view is correct : there is no economically defensible reason to tip except that one believes , for whatever reason , that one should do so . Tipping well under this circumstance signals to others one ’ s belief that one ought to tip . While any particular instance of this behavior is unlikely to benefit one in the future , the signals sent to others may , together , determine how one ’ s traits are perceived in a population . This may indirectly benefit the agent if she is treated better because of her altruism .
Yet dishonest signaling of this variety is more likely to benefit the agent if executed correctly . Someone who understands her culture well is able to exploit this signaling system only for personal gain . Honest altruistic signaling may therefore be an example of the “ handicap ” principle described by Zahavi ( 1975 ): it may cost less to an agent to fake an altruistic signal than to communicate one genuinely , suggesting that altruism will be faked whenever someone believes she can successfully deceive .
It does not follow , however , that honest altruistic signaling is always a handicap , or that a particular agent will either always attempt to deceive or always signal honestly . Individuals differ only in the circumstances under which they will deceive , rather than in some binary sense where a particular individual always intends to deceive or be honest ( Trivers , 1971 ). In a setting where other agents are likely to help one another – or at least where there are sufficient deterrents to prevent deception – altruistic signaling will not be a handicap . The cost of behaving altruistically may be counterbalanced by the risk of one ’ s intended deception being detected . Conditional honesty is therefore probably favored , though the conditions are grounded in circumstance rather than the perceived odds of reciprocity alone .
Honest signaling is , for example , less likely if one is further removed from those with whom one interacts . Consider a system in which individuals representing institutions succeed only when their work-output receives approval points from others working within the same system . Receiving many approval points for one ’ s work is beneficial for one ’ s career and institution , making points invaluable for any individual . The institutions one represents are , furthermore , competing for scarce resources , so individuals
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