ASEBL Journal – Volume 13 Issue 1 , January 2018
Yet even this combined definition does not provide necessary or sufficient criteria for altruistic behavior . I might intend to give someone a gift that benefits the recipient without behaving altruistically by violating the social norms of gift-giving . If I am under the impression that the attendees of some party are bringing small gifts , and bring a small gift myself , it is possible that I will bring a disproportionately small gift that will stand out as cheap and ungenerous .
I might also fail to understand how gift-giving , the etiquette of which depends on context , is done appropriately in a foreign culture : someone who comes to many Western cultures , for example , might be surprised that his gift of paper money is received strangely at a party where other guests bring wrapped gifts . Someone who brings expensive non-Kosher meat into a religious Jewish person ’ s house is likely to offend that person , even if her intentions in bringing the gift are generous . In many cases giftgiving will not be considered altruistic , for example if a gift is given only out of etiquette-following ; it is the intention attributed to the giver , either because of the generosity of the gift or the manner in which the gift is made , that determines whether the act of giving is altruistic .
In these situations – or in any similar example – it is possible that I both intend to act altruistically and have a positive effect on a recipient without behaving altruistically . This possibility suggests a flaw in the approach all three definitions take to providing necessary or sufficient criteria for altruistic behavior .
One must also have practical understanding of how to behave altruistically : my knowledge of appropriate execution of actions directly influences how my behavior is perceived . This is similar to Wittgenstein ’ s ( 1953 ) discussion of understanding , where he argues that an individual does not understand a pattern only because she is able to continue it , but because of the social circumstances under which she is learning to follow the pattern . The learner understands only when her ability to follow the pattern is recognized by others , and her ability to reproduce the pattern is alone insufficient for her saying “ I understand how to go on .”
A similar argument is valid for altruistic behavior : an agent must understand how to apply the rules of gift-giving appropriately within a particular set of circumstances . One should bring a gift appropriate for the party one is attending : a boat is an inappropriate gift for a 10-year old ’ s birthday party , and yet perhaps not inappropriate from one world leader to another . The person who brings expensive meat to a religious Jewish person behaves altruistically only if she recognizes the customs the person practices .
Learning the nuances of gift-giving is contingent on understanding a culture and the practical rules thereof ; the claim that altruistic intention and positive effect are together necessary or sufficient for altruistic behavior is , therefore , unsound .
V . Altruistic behavior as a signal
The preceding arguments suggest that the criteria determining whether a behavior qualifies as altruistic are distinct from intention and effect . For a behavior to be altru-
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