ARRC Journal June 2016 | Page 4

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Competing Narratives in Hybrid Warfare

COMPETING NARRATIVES IN HYBRID WARFARE

Colonel John Harris , US Army

The pervasive information environment increasingly affects our freedom of action on the battlefield . Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps faced this challenge head on during the most recent exercise ARRCADE FUSION 15 . Faced with an adversary that aggressively leveraged the information space while presenting multiple dilemmas in the cognitive as well as the physical space , the staff wrestled with the challenge of posturing our military capability while also simultaneously posturing our messaging against a pervasive adversary narrative . The ambiguous situation was ripe for exploitation by our adversary that repeatedly clouded the situation with actions and words which were deniable and ambiguous by design .

While the ARRC team had a well-crafted strategic narrative , we found ourselves challenged to compete effectively when the adversary clearly had the advantage in the battle for the narrative . Our adversary understood the population , their concerns and was relentless in volume , intensity and frequency . To make matters even more challenging , we had limited combat forces on the ground and very little activity to magnify as a venue for getting our messaging into the conversation .

In an effort to better understand and explain the nature of the battle of competing narratives , our team crafted an enemy narrative , based on the statements , actions and motivations of our adversary . This narrative was our best guess at describing the story , justification and meaning behind the numerous actions , images and statements of our adversary . The value of taking time to draft our adversary narrative proved to be time well spent . Not only did it help the team get into the adversary ’ s head and better understand his motivations and justifications for action , but it also served as a tool to anticipate his actions , and likely statements in the information domain , which allowed us to not only anticipate , but also to prepare for physical and cognitive responses .

Taken one step further , we mapped out where the elements of our adversary and our narratives were actively being played out in competition , on the ground , inside our area of responsibility ( Figure 1 ). What we found is that this battle of competing narratives can be portrayed much in the same manner that you can depict military formations posturing for an attack . Rather than depicting the number of infantry battalions , we depicted the portions of the adversary narrative that are actively being leveraged with the target audiences in that region . We then laid out which elements of our narrative were also being played out in the same space and the result was a usable depiction of the battle for competing narratives .

Once we mapped this out , it became quite clear that rather than a wide ambiguous ill-defined problem , we in reality had three discrete hotspots , each one slightly different in nature and with not only different competing messages , but also different target audiences . The depiction also showed which of the three hot spots was the most active information battle , which allowed us to prioritize our efforts . Again this was a useful staff exercise , which served as a catalyst for additional thinking . Now that we could see , understand and depict the information fight , the next obvious questions for the team were The So What and how do we use this information to better prosecute the fight ?

The team then looked at each of the three hotspots in greater detail ( Figure 2 ). We laid out the information environment estimate for each of the areas in detail . Specifically , we mapped out the various traditional media sources ( Radio , Print & Television ), by language , reach , audience , segmentation , and penetration . We looked at which mediums our adversary was using to deliver their messaging ; we then used social media tools to isolate and identify the demographics of the ongoing social media activity , which provided valuable insight into the segmentation of audiences , identifying which specific social media platforms were used by which demographic , which were the most popular , and more interesting was the understanding of what was being

HQ BFOR STRATCOM NARRATIVE BOTHNIAN STRATCOM NARRATIVE

What is the Problem

� Perception by NATO of growing threat to stability of NE Baltic Region from BDR . � Increasing challenges to the security and sovereignty of the 3B . � Reinforce NATO ’ s commitment to Collective Defence of its members . � Increasingly aggressive actions toward 3B by BDR .

Why we are here

• Crisis Management

• Cooperative Security

• Provide assurance to NATO members

• Potential opponents understand NATO ’ s purpose , resolve and capability .

• Request for assistance by Alliance members .

Actions to achieve Endstate Demonstrate Capability and Resolve Deploy to Baltics

Integrate NATO and NHDF / security force elements

Conduct combined / partnered operations with 3B Military & Security Forces

Set conditions for Follow-On-Forces

Counter Ambiguous Approach Promote 3B actions to address conditions within ‘ Hotpsots ’

Disrupt / Degrade / Diminish maligned influences targeting 3B

Promote NATO ’ s capabilities , resolve and unity to B3 , Alliance and International Audiences .

Legitimacy : NATO ’ s core business is to provide assurance to its members . Allies are operating under the North Atlantic Treaty and operate within international law , including the United Nations Charter , and this deployment falls within that framework .

HQ BFOR

Objectives :

• 3B sovereignty protected and territorial integrity maintained .

• NATO and Baltic Region Nations assured of Alliance ’ s commitment to collective defence .

• Intervention from external actors deterred / defeated .

Endstate :

• Threats to stability of NE Baltic security reduced .

• Alliance members assured of NATO unity , capability and resolve to protect them from external threats .

What we are not here to do : NATO does not pose a threat to any other country

What is the Problem

� Discrimination and repression wrt Bothnian conationals

� Challenges to security and safety of Bothnian conationals living in 3B states

�Challenges to Bothnian state as a power

� NATO and EU encroachment on BDR borders

Why we are here

• Provide security for co-nationals

• Protect the Bothnian way of life

• Demonstrate Bothnian capability to counter NATO / EU encroachment

• Assure Bothnian nation

• Demonstrate Bothnia ’ s power and capabilities for purposes of deterrence

Actions to achieve Endstate

Support Bothnian Co-Nationals Provide support to Bothnian co-nationals in 3B states

Disrupt attempts to deny Bothnian national identity

Deter NATO Encroachment Posture against NATO aggression

Promote primacy of Bothnian identity via IO

Demonstrate Capability and Resolve

Defend interests through projection of appropriate power

Promote Bothnia ’ s role as regional and international power

Promote role as regional and international power

Legitimacy : Bothnian ’ s core business is to protect its socialist achievements against external intervention . Bothnia state has a repsonsibility to protect Bothnian co-nationals , especially where such conationals request assistance and protection from the Bothnian nation .

Bothnians in 3B Endstate :

Bothnian

• Secure rights Endstate : and responsibilities

• Protect the of Bothnian conationals

Bothnian socialist achievements

• Protection of against all

Bothnian identity external attacks . and moral values

• NATO / EU

• Protection of

expansionism the Bothnian and nation from

encroachment encroachment deterred in and

favour of greater expansionism inter-regional relationship

What we are not here to do : Overthrow 3B Governments ; start a larger regional conflict

Figure 1 : Map of competing narratives within the Ex ARRCADE FUSION training scenario