Exercise ARRCADE BUGLE – Studying the Past to Inform an Approach for the Future
high casualty rates
and the acceptance
of risk being dictated
by the situation; de-
pendent on whether
or not the operation
is an imperative to en-
sure national survival
or in the assistance of
another NATO nation
as part of an Article V
operation.
3rd Infantry Division disembarking from LCI (L)
Source: Sgt William Heller’s World War II Memoirs
Culmination
Op DRAGOON was a success for the Allied
forces. It enabled them to liberate most of
France in only 4 weeks, while inflicting heavy
casualties on the German forces. However,
because the battle plan had envisaged stiffer
resistance near the beaches, the immediate
need for transport was badly underestimated.
Fuel consumption outstripped supply and the
shortfall proved to be a greater impediment to
the advance than the German defence. De-
spite being a huge operational success, the
Allied commanders were not able to exploit
tactical opportunities because the planning
had focussed on establishing a bridgehead
from which to fight inland and as a result
had ensured large quantities of heavy, battle
winning munitions were inloaded in the first
re-supply ships. Instead what they required
was the ability to rapidly advance inland in
pursuit of the retreating forces. As a result,
the Allies were not able to cut off the most
valuable units of the retreating Army Group
G, which escaped into the Vosges Moun-
tains, however over 130,000 troops were left
trapped behind. On 14 Sep, the Seventh Army
was transferred from Mediterranean com-
mand to European command, marking the end
of DRAGOON. Unlike the bitter attrition that
took place at Anzio and Normandy, Op DRA-
GOON was an example of the Allies’ enormous
advantage in operational mobility via amphibi-
ous operations which enabled them to quickly
exploit the situation when it was presented to
them as a result of the Wehrmacht’s strategic
overextension. Due to the swift operational
success of DRAGOON, more Allied combat
power could be focused on the Allies’ advance
into Germany.
Key Contemporary Discussion
Themes
The staff ride allowed a number of themes,
which are directly relevant to HQ ARRC, to
be studied in the context of what happened
during Op DRAGOON followed by a discussion
of how contemporary military operations are
planned and executed. Discussion topics cov-
ered a diverse range of issues and enabled
cross pollination of information across all na-
tionalities and cap badges. The key planning
considerations and discussions included the
political landscape and willingness of nations
to commit forces to operations which entail
As with today, for any
NATO
deployment,
the planning needed
to be conducted in
close
co-ordination
with the Host Nation, albeit with the govern-
ment in exile for Op DRAGOON. It was noted
that in the contemporary environment, the
battlespace has become increasingly con-
gested due to population growth and the
expansion of urban areas. If NATO forces are
deploying to a failed or failing state then all
belligerent and non-belligerent factions and
other state and non-state actors need to be
incorporated into the planning considera-
tions as part of the Comprehensive Approach.
There are risks and complexities associated
with operating alongside or in the same ge-
ographic area as non-uniformed insurgents
which may share some but not all of the same
objectives that the international community is
trying to achieve and will have different moti-
vations and agendas to fulfill. Op DRAGOON
provides an excellent example of conventional
forces linking up with a local indigenous proxy
force which provided invaluable local intel-
ligence within the Area of Operations (AOR)
which the Allies were able to fully exploit. It
also provides an excellent example of how
large scale amphibious operations can be con-
ducted in a Joint and Multinational operation.
Operating within a multi-national coalition of-
fers a level of combat power which many NATO
nations cannot or are unwilling to commit uni-
laterally and is therefore a huge strength of
the alliance. However, the similar challenge
of interoperability at an operational level is an
enduring theme to consider when planning to
force generate and commit forces; unlike dur-
ing Op DRAGOON when no unit below Brigade
level was multinational, the enhanced NATO
Response Force (ENRF) requires multination-
al grouping down to sub-unit level which is to
demonstrate a political message which is not
wholly consistent with the preferred option for
operational reasons. Technological develop-
ments have also shaped the modern battle-
field, acting as a force multiplier which com-
manders seek to exploit to gain an advantage
over adversaries by speeding up the decision
making process.
Many of the fundamentals of planning and
executing modern military operations remains
the same as during WWII. Op DRAGOON pro-
vides an historic case study to understand
how to successfully synchronise all aspects of
a Joint operation, in a short timeframe, on a
scale which is rarely practiced or executed to-
day and draw lessons from the complexity of
the planning and command and control (C2) of
the operation. As a result, HQ ARRC will again
be studying Operation DRAGOON, as a staff
ride in 2017.
About the author:
Major Phil Rogerson, British Army, is
a supply plans officer at HQ ARRC
with more than 18 years of military
experience, having deployed on
operations to Northern Ireland, Iraq
and Afghanistan as well as spending
one year on loan service as a logistics
advisor to an Infantry Brigade in Sierra
Leone.
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