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Exercise ARRCADE BUGLE – Studying the Past to Inform an Approach for the Future
Purpose of a Staff Ride
Many commanders and staff have recent operational experience but this can be limited by specialisation and theatre of operations. Staff rides enable participants to consider past operations in a wider context in order to promote discussion and analysis of events that have direct application to modern operations at all levels in current and future environments. HQ ARRC staff rides were defined as:‘ The guided participatory analysis of selected historical operations at relevant locations, in order to develop the moral and conceptual components of Fighting Power across HQ ARRC.’
The aim of a staff ride is the proactive analysis of past operations from which direct application can be made to current and future operational environments.
Operational Overview
Op DRAGOON is ideal for HQ ARRC to study due to the size of the landing forces, multinational aspect( incorporating US, French, UK and Canadian forces) and integration of Land, Air, Maritime and Special Operations Forces with the added complexity of operating with indigenous irregular forces on the ground. Contemporary discussions focused on the role of a JTF HQ within a war fighting context to analyse how ARRC would plan and execute a similar contemporary operation in order to support the development of professional understanding and wider staff awareness. The exercise visited unfamiliar battlefield stands within the Provence-Alpes-Côtes d’ Azur Region, so the location greatly added to the experience as it was a novelty to travel to the South of France rather than the well-trodden staff rides that are usually conducted in Northern Europe. At a political level, Gen Charles De Gaulle was very keen for the Allies to conduct this operation, much to the resistance of Winston Churchill who felt that he had been“ dragooned” into accepting this operation rather than focusing on the Italian campaign which was his preferred option. However this was a highly successful operation which not only sped up the liberation of France but also opened up the key ports of Toulon and Marseillies through which 25 % of resources flowed to support the Allied forces fighting through France, Belgium and the Netherlands into Germany. Studying what happened during Op DRAGOON needs to be understood in the context of the Normandy D-Day Landings and subsequent operations to push towards the Rhine which was the focus for Ex ARRCADE BUGLE 1 in 2015. In Jul 1944, all stocks to sustain both British and US land forces, and the associated supporting air elements established in Northern France, had to be unloaded through the single surviving Mulberry Harbour at Arromanches. The capture of Cherbourg by the US at the end of June had not alleviated this problem as the berths and harbour facilities had been destroyed or rendered useless before the German surrender. All along the front, Allied troops were suffering severe shortages of vehicles, fuel and ammunition. Logistics, normally the servant of operations, was now threatening to become its master. Therefore opening up other ports in France to provide essential re-supply avenues to the Allies was of critical importance. The battle for supplies was about to take centre stage.
Strategic Context
Op DRAGOON, the Allied invasion of the South of France, was a strategically controversial operation. Although it was most successful in achieving its objectives, it has been argued that it was unnecessary. This line of argument maintains that the breakout from Normandy would have rendered the German position in the South of France untenable anyway and that the diversion of forces away from Italy to undertake DRAGOON prevented a possible break through the Alps into Austria( then part of the German Reich). To understand the reasons why DRAGOON caused such division among the Allies, it is important to appreciate the context of strategic events in the war in 1944.
The possibility of operations in Southern France was viewed very differently by the different nations of the Western Allies. De Gaulle was strongly in favour of a second invasion of France as soon as possible, since for him, the main priority was the liberation of France. Eisenhower also wished to invade France, as a means of bringing more American fighting power to bear against Germany as quickly and as directly as possible. He also recognised that support for the force that would be needed to enter Germany would require more major ports than were available in Northern France alone. Churchill on the other hand felt that it would be better to continue to push up through Italy, with a view to striking across the Alps into Southern Germany or East into the Balkans in order to limit Stalin’ s post-war dominance in that region.
The successes in the Western Mediterranean in 1943, including the capture of the whole of North Africa, followed by liberation of Sicily, gave the Allies options for follow on operations. An invasion of Northern France was planned for 1944, so plans were prepared for a similar set of landings in Southern France, intended to overstretch the German defence. These landings were codenamed ANVIL. However, in Apr 1944, the Allies realised that they had only enough force to conduct two major operations: Normandy was to be one and Italy the other. It was also clear that, in order to land in sufficient force to assure a large enough bridgehead in Normandy, all available landing craft would be needed. Thus without the forces, nor the landing craft to put them ashore, there was no prospect of a landing in Southern France. Plans for ANVIL were shelved.
At the end of Jun 1944, with the OVERLORD landings making slow progress across Normandy, the decision was taken to go ahead with ANVIL; due to security reasons ANVIL was renamed, with DRA- GOON the new name selected for the operation. Churchill strongly opposed the decision, realising that significant numbers of American and French colonial troops would have to be withdrawn from Italy. The transfer of these troops would take away any possibility of a rapid and decisive victory in Italy: slow progress would remain possible, but no more. Eisenhower remained firm in his support for DRA- GOON, and the troops were taken out of the fighting in Italy and prepared for amphibious operations. Eisenhower’ s view was that the best way to win the war was to concentrate as many troops as possible against Germany directly: he saw Italy as a diversionary campaign useful only for tying up German forces, but without scope to be decisive. He also recognised that, in order to bring America’ s advantage in materiel to bear, large ports in both northern and southern France, as well as the Low Countries, would be essential. Marseille in particular was vital.“ The Allies had four strategic advantages over the Wehrmacht in southern France: mobility, counter-mobility, intelligence and communication”( S. Zaloga, Operation Dragoon 1944, France’ s other D-Day, 2009). The Allies’ major advantage in terms of operational mobility, through their ability to prosecute amphibious operations across the Mediterranean region, naturally suited mounting an operation such as DRAGOON.
Rapid Advance
The Wehrmacht’ s Army Group G in southern and central France was weakened by diversions of its meager forces to Italy and Normandy. Instead of facing strong defensive positions, the Allies were able to quickly link up their forces after a successful amphibious landing preceded by an airborne landing. Op DRAGOON quickly became a rapid advance up the Rhône Valley in pursuit of the withdrawing German Forces. The heaviest fighting occurred further in land at Montélimar between 20- 26 Aug 1944 and by this time, the forward Allied forces were suffering from a serious lack of fuel and supplies, having advanced with unexpected speed. From 26 – 28 Aug, the majority of the German forces were able to escape and on 29 Aug the Allies captured Montélimar. The Germans suffered 2,100 battle casualties plus 8,000 POWs, while the Americans had 1,575 casualties. On 28 Aug, the Montelimar battle was over, and both ports were in Allied hands. The French Divisions soon followed the US Division north, and continued to pursue the Germans, linking up with Patton’ s forces on 10 Sep.
Operation DRAGOON 15 Aug 1944 Source: Operation DRAGOON 1944, Osprey Publishing