ARRC JOURNAL
which was exploited by the Luftwaffe,
as was the lack of tactical air support to
the land component in the close battle. It
also led to one of the great tragedies of
the operation when a lack of coordination
and battlespace deconfliction caused the
invasion fleet to mistakenly fire en masse
at the formations of transport aircraft that
carried the airborne contingent, leading
to serious losses of soldiers, pilots
and aircraft. It will be up to the JTF to
ensure that the efforts of the component
commands are pulling in the same
direction, ensuring that their actions are
properly deconflicted and are mutually
supporting both in the planning and
execution phases.
The Allies also failed to engage their
Axis opponents in the deep battlespace.
Due to the detachment of AFHQ from
the operational area, and the land
dominance of the headquarters in Sicily,
Operation HUSKY demanded a previously unprecedented level of Inter-Component cooperation.
These
include
the importance of
unifying component
command planning;
ensuring the land
component
does
not dominate the
planning process to
the detriment of the
campaign; ensuring a
common battlespace
Operation HUSKY featured some novel and unpractised modes of Inter-
picture
across
Component warfare with mixed success. This US Waco Glider was one of
the
component
many that did not make landfall; a victim of inter-component and operator
inexperience.
commands;
and,
finally, making sure
too great an emphasis was put on the
that there is an appreciation of the close,
close land battle to achieve the decisive
deep and rear battle across the force. The
effect. Throughout the operation, the
lessons the Allies learned in Sicily were
air components of both the UK and
later put to good use when the campaign
US maintained a focus on strategic
continued onto the Italian mainland and
bombing of the Axis heartlands. Neither
when subsequent amphibious invasions
country sufficiently resourced efforts
to understand the Axis rear area and
conduct deep offensive operations.
This allowed Axis forces breathing
room to manage their battlespace and
components better, conducting an
organised withdrawal to a succession of
strong positions in the close battle whilst
preparing their rear area for evacuation.
Ultimately, they managed to evacuate
53,545 soldiers, 50 tanks, 9,185 vehicles
and almost 12,000 tonnes of stores over
the Straits of Messina to fight again with
virtually no Allied effort made to interdict
them. The JTF role demands that the
headquarters possess a full appreciation
of the whole battle – close, deep and
rear – and coordinate the efforts in each
to achieve a decisive effect.
To conclude, this essay touched on the
salient lessons that a NATO HRF(L)
can learn about the conduct of the JTF
role from the 1943 Sicily Campaign.
80
ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS
were conducted in Normandy and the
South of France in 1944. All of these
were much more successful Joint Allied
actions in comparison. A prospective
NATO JTF should heed these valuable
lessons from history.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Major Andy Cox is a 17-year veteran of
the British Army and currently serves as
the ARRC’s Movements Planning Officer.
In his previous assignment he served as
a Squadron Commander at the British
Army’s Defence School of Transport in
Leconfield, England. Maj. Cox has led
combat logistics operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. A native of Wolverhampton,
England, Maj. Cox holds a Master’s
Degree in Military History from the
University of Birmingham.
A map of the final stage of the campaign. The Axis forces were able to
stage an orderly withdrawal from Sicily, aided partially by the Allied lack of
appreciation for Inter-Component Deep Offensive Operations.