READY FOR TODAY – EVOLVING FOR TOMORROW
THE SICILY CAMPAIGN OF 1943:
LESSONS FOR A PROSPECTIVE
JOINT TASK FORCE
Major Andrew Cox, British Army
It is no wonder that Sicily is the destination of both Exercise ARRCADE CAESAR 2018
and Exercise ARRCADE BUGLE 1-19, as the invasion of the island in July 1943 is an
interesting study in the inherent problems and frictions that can face a joint task force
headquarters (JTF) commanding troops from an alliance of countries.
This essay will highlight some of the main lessons that a JTF can learn from the 1943
Allied campaign in Sicily.
The Allied invasion of Sicily (Operation
HUSKY), which began on 10 July 1943
and lasted for 38 days, was born of the
need to continue pressure upon Axis
forces in the Mediterranean Theatre
of Operations following the conclusion
of operations in North Africa. It was
a strategic imperative for the Allies to
open a new front, as the projected
invasion of Northwest Europe was not
yet ready. The campaign was only the
second conducted under joint US/UK
command after the invasion of Northwest
Africa. It featured many unconventional
and new modes of warfare, such as
massed amphibious, parachute and
gliderborne operations, which demanded
an unprecedented level of alliance and
inter-service cooperation. Such a high
level of coordination was quite unfamiliar
A Campaign Map of Operation HUSKY.
and even considered threatening to
the organisations concerned at the
time. Therefore, many frictions were
encountered, mistakes made and
lessons learned.
One such lesson was the conduct of the
joint headquarters and its relationship
with its subordinate commands. During
HUSKY the joint headquarters (Allied
Force Headquarters (AFHQ), based in
Tunisia) was not present at the operational
level in Sicily itself, and component
commands planned almost in isolation.
The result was a campaign that was land
component planned and dominated,
which overlooked opportunities for joint
action. The greatest example of this was
a critical opportunity that was missed
and would have trapped Axis forces in
Sicily by closing the
Messina Strait early
in the campaign.
Each
component
independently
dismissed
closing
the
heavily
defended strait as
not feasible, but as
a joint operation it
would have been a
possibility. There is
a clear lesson here
that land component
dominance
must
be resisted and all
component commands must be robustly
directed and fully integrated into the plan.
This will become critical to remember
when the ARRC adopts the integrated
and stretched model, which combines
the JTF and Land Component Command
within the same headquarters.
Linked to the previous point, another
lesson identified was the need for
a common operating picture of the
battlespace amongst the components
at the operational and tactical level.
Failure of the Allied forces to do this
led to many missed opportunities and
mistakes, especially in the amphibious
assault stage of the operation where
joint action was most critical. Amongst
the land and maritime forces, a level of
integrated action was achieved out of
proximity and necessity. This led to an
impressive level of coordinated action:
The ‘Beach Bricks’, joint units configured
for the management and clearance of the
beaches, which were successful as was
the provision of naval gunfire to support
the most critical phases of the operation.
Later, the maritime component enabled
a series of battlegroup-sized amphibious
attacks on the northern coast of Sicily
with the intent of outflanking Axis
defensive positions.
However, the air component was not
integrated at the operational and tactical
levels, and so it acted independently.
This led to gaps in fighter coverage,
ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS
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