READY FOR TODAY – EVOLVING FOR TOMORROW
Phase Two: Terrorism and
guerrilla warfare
Terrorism is “the unlawful use of violence
and intimidation, especially against
civilians, in the pursuit of political aims.” 14
The initial deployment of Russia’s ‘little
green men’ during the annexation of
Crimea in 2014 was, by the definition
above, an act of terrorism. 15 Executed
at a time when the West was focused
on the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the
‘ground’ was prepared. 16 The West’s
public had little appetite for foreign
intervention, empowering the Kremlin to
act in an expansionist manner towards its
neighbours. Strategic action supported
by the Kremlin’s cyber soldiers, using
methods targeted at the tactical level
(individuals or small groups), extortion,
kidnapping, bribery to name a few; all are
highly effective in part thanks to today’s
social media influenced, information
space. The ‘weaponising’ of information
facilitates the continuous dynamic
targeting of an adversary’s moral
component; its reach is almost unlimited
as global information consumption
increases. 17
Phase Three: Conventional
warfare
The Kremlin is currently subject to UN
and EU sanctions that are crippling
its economy. Economic warfare is a
tool for the West because it is one
of its strengths; for Russia it is not. 18
The virtual domain, which includes
cyber activities, enables a new form
of warfare, not visible to many, to be
waged at scales that are unimaginable.
The enduring nature of economic war
indirectly affects the global population
in the cyber and information domains,
both of which remain conceptual. 19 20 .
The modern aggressor lacks a physical
presence, meaning any act is often
difficult to attribute in a timely manner to
an individual, let alone a state. 21 During
the Cold War there were proxy conflicts,
conventional by nature, but detached
from the superpowers’ populations by
geography. We see the same today in
Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Yemen,
Syria, Lebanon and Libya to name a
few. The superpowers are often on
opposing sides, both geographically
and ideologically, however, the effect of
geography is negated more than ever
due to the speed at which information
proliferates.
Critically, as Mao did, when the Kremlin
finds a weakness in the information
space, it exploits. When it finds strength,
it adapts, harassing and seeking another
avenue of attack (changing its narrative
until it finds traction). This tactic allows
the Kremlin to out-manoeuvre the West
in the information space, leading to the
erosion of public confidence in leaders
and organisations, paralysing the
enemy’s decision makers. 22 The British
Army’s Chief of the General Staff’s RUSI
speech on 22 January 2018, spoke about
the speed of recognition, the speed
of decision-making and the speed of
assembly: One of the first commanders
to recognise this need in the information
space. Without it we will give the Kremlin
a victory, potentially before Western
soldiers leave their barracks.
Operation
CABRIT
1
saw
the
establishment of the UK-led enhanced
Forward Presence (eFP) battlegroup
Tapa, Estonia. The deployment was,
according to the Prime Minister of
Estonia, one of the four most important
events in Estonia’s recent history and
is a statement that reinforces NATO’s
indivisible nature and willingness to act.
The eFP BG’s understanding of Estonia
was low, as expected, but what was lower
was the understanding of the information
environment and the role the media
played. The Future Force Concept (FCC)
states, “In particular we lag well behind
in our ability to exploit the information
environment and in the full integration of
space and cyber domains.”
Enabling joint action across the five
domains is the baseline for operations
in all future conflicts. The UK’s layered
operational design eases planning from
battlegroup to army level by dividing
the battlespace and giving each an
area of responsibility. The key is the
deep battle. The deep battle degrades
a numerically superior enemy to a point
at which success is likely. How does one
use cyber and information in the deep
battle? The controlling and manipulation
of physical traffic patterns is a simple
example (assuming most conflicts will be
either littoral or urban due to population
dispositions). 23 To hamper an enemy’s
logistics, a commander may attack
convoys from the air. However, fifth
generation aircraft on both sides contests
the air domain and attacks may be
costly. 24 Therefore, the commander may
instead choose to change traffic patterns;
sowing chaos into the civilian population,
consuming the enemy’s combat power
and forcing him to reallocate resources to
ensure supply routes are kept clear. Add
a localised misinformation campaign and
the enemy could face choreographed
chaos amongst the population and, in
some cases, amongst its troops. The
enemy is subjected to ‘Black Mist’ – the
temporary psychological disorientation
of a group through the delivery of
deliberately ambiguous information to
create chaos (controlled or otherwise)
giving the commander time to act. 25
The Kremlin’s strength lies in its patience
and ability to collect information. For
example, the eFP battlegroups were
subjected to Kremlin misinformation after
the North Atlantic Council announced
they would receive the Freedom Award
in 2017. 26 The Kremlin-controlled
channel, Sputnik, released an article that
stated that in one week eFP battlegroup
soldiers were caught drunk, had caused
damage to public property, had rolled a
vehicle and, finally, had been shot at by a
local farmer during a pan-NATO exercise.
The events that Sputnik highlighted took
place over four months, not seven days;
the details of such events were, and
still are, misreported. 27 The story gained
little traction across all internal Russian
14 Google definition
15 Pamela Engel, “Obama reportedly declined to enforce red line in Syria after Iran threatened to back out of nuclear deal,” Business Insider, August 23, 2016, https://www.businessinsider.com/
obama-red-line-syria-iran-2016-8?r=UK.
16 Author deployed on Op HERRICK 20 (2014), monitored situation.
17 Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss, “The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money,” The Interpreter, https://www.stratcomcoe.org/download/file/
fid/1739.
18 Author Unknown, “International sanctions during the Ukraine Crisis,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions_during_the_Ukrainian_crisis.
19 Hazel Henderson, “Building a win-win world: Life beyond global economic warfare,” Ifarus, October 25, 2015, https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=MLIVtahDtHsC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1
1&dq=theory+of+economic+warfare&ots=VQoSwz0EsX&sig=1PFvbi24TpnWI6H-7ZQdWhJBsEM#v=onepage&q=theory%20of%20economic%20warfare&f=false.
20 Nearly impossible to define in a physical sense or make easily relatable
21 Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan, “Attributing cyber-attacks,” Journal of Strategic Studies, December 23, 2014, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2014.977382.
22 “Manipulating the ooda loop: the overlooked role of information resource management in information warfare”, thesis by Gregory M. Schechtman Captain, USAF.
23 Human, ground vehicles, aircraft, shipping, etc
24 Ministry of Defence, “Future Air and Space Operating Concept,” Ministry of Defence, September 13, 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/joint-concept-note-3-12-future-air-and-
space-operating-concept.
25 Author defined
26 Author Unknown, “Medal for Knavery, Estonia to award rampaging NATO troops with military honours,” Sputnik News, July 6, 2017, https://sputniknews.com/europe/201707061055293887-
estonia-nato-medal/.
27 Author was manager of event in 5 Rifles BG and tracked live media feeds.
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