READY FOR TODAY – EVOLVING FOR TOMORROW
systems in the JOA/Area of Operation
(AO). The CoG analysis supplements
the factor analysis during the mission
analysis, enabling the planning process
to go further, even with no complete
understanding of the systems.
• Second, the CoG concept focusses
planning efforts and efficiency of
operations. Planners using the outputs
of CoG analysis are able to focus on
strengths and weaknesses –protect
friendly forces and attack the adversary’s
key nodes. The identified CRs and
CVs translated into DCs effects and
objectives or tasks for subordinates. In
this way, the CoG contributes to building
an operational approach (operations
design) to solve the operational
problem. Actually, it functions as a bond
between objectives, DCs, effects with
(subordinates’) missions and tasks.
Planners thus can concentrate efforts
on specific elements/targets, prioritising
actions and resources in achieving the
objectives. Consequently, the CoG
improves the efficiency of operations.
Focussing on an adversary’s key
elements and then prioritising available
resources, it enables the prudent use of
the combat power. In fact, it prevents
a waste of resources (lives-materiel-
money) and time.
Conclusion
This essay seeks to give a holistic
view of the famous, yet controversial,
concept of CoG. It started with a brief
overview about what CoG is. Initially, it
was introduced into US Military doctrine
during 1980s. Since then its definition
has evolved over the time, aiming to
become more ‘digestible’. Today, it could
be said that, in simple words, the CoG is
the main source of power that provides
an actor freedom of action at the political/
strategic, operational and tactical levels
of war. Different levels mean different
CoGs.
The key question regarding the CoG
has been – and in some cases still is –
how can the CoG be identified and then
exploited? A variety of models have
been developed in an attempt to find a
logical path to identify and use the CoG.
Warden’s Strategic Ring, Barlow’s (NEV)
model, CARVER’s and the Godzilla
methods are some of them. However, the
existing model in NATO originates from
Dr. Strange’s – refined by Col. Eikmeier
– ‘revolutionary’ method of critical factors
(CG-CCs-CRs-CVs).
This
method,
adapted slightly, is used by the ARRC
in identifying and, most importantly,
analysing the CoG.
As for the utility of the concept, the CoG
has proved to be a useful planning tool.
It is strongly related to the concepts of
Operational Art and Operational Design.
It links objectives, DCs, effects, mission
and tasks. In this way it functions as a focal
point for all levels of warfare and ensures
coherence. Its analysis – through aim/
objectives, CCs, CRs and CVs – reveals
strengths and weaknesses, which in
turn contribute to an understanding
of the problem and in developing an
efficient operational approach (protect
friendly forces and attack an adversary’s
vulnerabilities in a direct/indirect manner,
defeat/stability mechanisms, operations
framework/design). However, planners
should keep in mind that:
• CoG
analysis requires the best
knowledge that we can get for the actors/
system (operational environment).
• Changes to the situation/conditions or
actors’ objectives/capabilities entail
repetition of CoG analysis and potential
plan amendments.
• The purpose of CoG analysis is not the
identification of a name for the name
itself. The usefulness of the concept
lies in identifying possible ways (CCs),
means (CRs) and weaknesses (CVs).
Don’t waste time fighting each other
over a name.
a problem solving tool. We should keep
in mind that sometimes the problem is
not the tool itself, but how it’s used. Here
in the ARRC G5 cell we hope this essay
persuades the reader that CoG, while not
necessarily cutting through the Gordian
Knot on its own, can help untangle the
strands and thus still has utility as a
planning tool.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Colonel Konstantinos Alexandris is a
30-year veteran of the Hellenic Army
and currently serves as team leader
for the ARRC’s Future Plans (G5) cell.
As an Armour officer he has served
in tank units for more than 10 years;
in his previous two assignments he
served as the Commander for an
armoured reconnaissance unit and as
the Operations Officer for a Hellenic
Army division. A native of Rhodes Island,
Greece, Col. Alexandris is a graduate of
the Hellenic National Defence College
and is currently working towards a
Master’s Degree in Applied Strategy and
International Security at the University of
Plymouth.
While the CoG has been an integral part
of planning for almost 30 years, it still
provokes discussions and debates over
its use. How can an old and so vague
concept be used today? How can an 18th
century idea possibly be relevant in our
high-tech age and in a highly complex
modern operational environment? The
answer to those who consider the CoG
obsolete could be given by the CoG
itself: ‘I’m still relevant, because I’m still
useful’. As already explained, the CoG
contributes to understanding, focusses
planning efforts and increases efficiency.
To conclude, despite the challenging
aspects of the concept and the
debates that may arise, the CoG
is still on the ‘scene’ in support of
planning. Undoubtedly its definition and
implementation has been improved
over time thanks to the contribution of
Dr. Strange and Col. Eikmeier. It may
not be the perfect tool that some of us
want, but it works. The reality is that
the CoG is part of the planning process
(mission analysis) and is complementary
to factor analysis. It supports planners
and commanders in finding the most
effective way to defeat an adversary.
It underpins planning through framing
problems and approaching solutions. It is
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