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Last, but not least, failure in identifying
a specific entity as a CoG – what the
CoG is, in terms of name – does not
mean the end of the world. There may
be times when a COG is clear. Yet, often
the real COG will be difficult to determine
due to a tendency to identify a single
source of power for all the identified
CCs. Most of the time, particularly in
a complex operational environment,
planners link the CCs with more than
two CRs. In situations like this, planners
can find themselves involved in long
lasting discussions and arguments about
what the CoG is. However, even under
these circumstances there is no issue.
We could recommend ‘do not pay so
much attention to the name of the CoG’
– ‘Don’t waste your valuable time’. The
aim of CoG analysis is not to provide a
name for a CoG by which the enemy will
be defeated. Rather, the crucial purpose
of the process is to identify CRs and
CVs. Through these two critical factors
the commander can avoid strengths
and exploit vulnerabilities, and select
an operational approach to degrade an
adversary’s capabilities and minimise the
exposure of his own. Besides, a revision
of the analysis later may have better and
more accurate results in terms of the
CoG name, if one believes it a problem.
Challenging the CoG
Although the concept of CoG has been
adopted by NATO and various other
militaries, it is a controversial issue. It
has received a lot of criticism related
primarily to its relevance. How can a
200-year-old concept, with reference
to warfare tactics, equipment and
conditions completely different from our
modern operational environment, be
relevant today? Military theorists and
planners are debating over the utility and
relevance of the CoG, even after more
than 30 years after its introduction into
military doctrine and implementation. 40
In fact, the criticism of CoG could
be viewed as an outcome of its
‘experimental’ use in the modern
operational environment (e.g. Iraq).
The lack, or the vagueness, of CoG’s
definition as well as the absence of an
efficient and effective analysis method
led to operational shortfalls, a waste of
time and resources and, consequently,
to arguments about the utility of the
CoG concept in the modern operational
environment.
A Source of Criticism
• Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm (1990-91): A lack of common
and clarified COG definition resulted
in shortfalls in unity of effort and
synchronisation. General Norman
Schwarzkopf selected three CoGs
rather than focus on one. They were:
leadership and C2 nodes, weapons
of mass destruction (WMD), and
the Republican Guard Forces. The
leadership and C2 CoG fit the Air Force’s
airpower. The Republican Guard CoG
fit the Army’s understanding of the
COG so that was their focus. Both
services considered the WMD COG
necessary, albeit a distraction. The
result was separate service/domain
fights that independently focussed on
different CoGs and produced needless
friction.
• Iraq 2005: The lack of a practical COG
identification process led General
George Casey to misidentify the
true COG. Planners briefed him on
two CoGs: the Iraqi government and
the population. One planner, using
a then-current doctrinal method,
recommended the Iraqi government.
Col Eikmeier proposed the population
as the COG. Using a “not in doctrine”
method of ends, ways, and means
analysis, he concluded that the
population would decide the outcome
of the insurgency; they were the “doer”
and the COG. General Casey selected
the Iraqi government as the COG.
Months later in 2006 the insurgency
rose to new levels of violence. In
2007, General David Petraeus
took command and implemented a
population-centric counterinsurgency
strategy. His strategy saw significant
elements of the population turn against
the insurgents, resulting in coalition
and Iraqi security forces rolling back
the insurgency.
Eikmeier Dale. The Center of Gravity.
Still Relevant After All These Years?
Colonel Dale Eikmeier recognises two
trends of criticism about the irrelevance
of CoG: ‘Practitioners’ and ‘philosophers’.
Both reject the concept of CoG, but for
different reasons.
• The so-called ‘practitioners’ consider
the CoG an abstract concept with vague,
unclear definition and thus is not useful.
After many years of discussions about
what a CoG is – changes of definition
– and how a CoG can be identified and
used in planning (an overview provided
above) led to confusion and denial.
How could such an unsettled theory
underpin the development of a plan?
Thus, they reject the CoG as a planning
tool, primarily due to its poor definition,
doctrinal shortfalls and lack of clear
method of analysis.
• ‘Philosophers’ reject it because it is
an old concept that is not relevant
today. Their main argument is based
on the tactical, technological and
philosophical differences between the
18th century and our era. They argue
that a pre-industrial military concept is
not applicable to our technologically
advanced age of the complex
operational environment of hybrid or
insurgency warfare. It is not relevant
anymore. It is too simple a concept to
assist in understanding a contemporary,
rapidly changing and complicated
operational environment with non-state
actors involved in conflicts.
Nevertheless, the relevance of the CoG
theory should be seen through the
lens of its utility. It could be said that if
something is useful then it is still relevant.
Planning develops viable options to
achieve an acceptable outcome from an
unacceptable situation. The results of
planning articulate how actions (ways)
and resources (means) are used to
achieve objectives (ends). 41 In these
two last sentences lies the usefulness
of CoG as a planning tool. As long as
planning remains relevant, regardless of
technological advancements and tactics,
the CoG is also relevant. As briefly
explained at the beginning of this essay,
since the introduction of CoG in modern
military doctrine/planning, its definition
and implementation has conceptually
evolved. Its definition has been simplified
and an analytical methodology has been
developed. The CoG has become a
useful planning tool as it is explained
below:
• First,
no matter how complex
the operational environment is, it
contributes to understanding of
the operational problem. The CoG
analysis method through the Critical
Factors (CCs-CRs-CVs) promotes
understanding of complex systems
– with state and non-state actors –
reaching reasonable conclusions about
the interdependence and interaction of
the different actors involved in a conflict.
The CoG links the aim/objectives of
actors, the ways or actions each actor
will use to achieve the objectives (CCs),
the means – what gives each actor
the ability to support its ways (CRs –
CoG), and finally vulnerabilities (CVs).
In this way, planners acquire a clear
picture of the trends in the operational
environment, focussing on specific
actors and relationships. The CoG
concept mitigates the complexity of the
39 Rueschhoff, Jan L. & Dunne, Jonathan. Ibid, p.121-122.
40 The concept of CoG provokes discussions about its utility and relevance today. The following articles and the respective comments by readers give an idea of the ongoing debate. Col.
Dale C. Eikmeier, US Army, Retired. Give Carl von Clausewitz and the Center of Gravity a Divorce, Small Wars Journal, July 2, 2013, at http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/give-carl-von-
clausewitz-and-the-center-of-gravity-a-divorce and Col. Dale
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