READY FOR TODAY – EVOLVING FOR TOMORROW
Russia has chosen a different path. But
why?
President Putin has chosen anti-Western
rhetoric and nationalist self-assertion
as the foundation for his regime and
he justifies Russia’s aggressive actions
on the basis of perceived Western
encirclement. This means that current
Russian sentiment will not change
quickly. But should we not be looking
to dispel his fears? While deterring,
competing and engaging do not exclude
each other, a flexible, adaptable political
approach and military posture is still
needed. Avoiding mis-calculation and
achieving conflict prevention, regardless
of the competition, remains crucial.
While politicians and diplomats engage
with Russia to understand the mutually
acceptable middle ground, they also
need to understand when deterrence
can antagonise. History has shown that
Russia will rise to the challenge, but we
do not need to make it a challenge.
Future
A state will rarely need to fight if it deters
effectively enough. The military arm of
NATO must improve its understanding of
deterrence, and ability to deter – indeed
it should always look to, particularly while
the threat changes so regularly. How
can the military arm of NATO improve?
• Make training complex. Training must
be as complex as the most demanding
scenario.
A truly responsive and
effective multi-national military force
can only be established through more,
and better, training.
Forces also
can improve through specialisation
- because they are able to train more
regularly for that discipline.
• Use the Corps HQ. For warfighting
at scale (an essential skill for effective
deterrence), the Corps HQ role is
missing in the NATO Long Term
Rotation Plan (LTRP). This manifests
itself in capability gaps, and reduced
understanding of the challenges of
warfighting at scale against a peer
adversary in the complex environment
of the 21st Century. The Corps HQ also
provides the important gearing between
the Land Component Command (LCC)
and Divisional levels of command and
can coordinate the activity of up to five
divisions (a LCC HQ cannot because
it sits at the Operational level and
thus has a longer planning horizon)
and corps troops. It will also focus
on shaping the various levels of deep
battlespace to ensure success in the
Close battle.
Russian cartoon highlighting Deterrence or Provocation
• Make time to train. The SACEUR-
endorsed LTRP dictates when certified
HRFs are at Readiness. For HQ
ARRC it shows us when we are to
be at Readiness either as a Joint HQ
(Strategic/ Operational level) or LCC
HQ (Operational). The issue is that
there is no time set aside to specialise
as a NATO Corps HQ (higher-tactical)
and you cannot become a warfighting
Corps HQ overnight. Ex ARRACE
FUSION 17 also demonstrated that it
takes time to excel at commanding at
the Corps level: it is the most challenging
role that the ARRC undertakes.
• Specialise. A Corps HQ operates within
the detail of the higher-tactical level
thus more, not less, time is needed to
maintain/ improve processes. Rotating
through different roles can contribute
to the challenges a HQ staff will face
and potentially accelerate skill fade. To
maintain and improve the ability of a
HQ it stands to reason that they should
specialise on a particular discipline. We
are beginning to see this emerge while
MNC-NE now has a regional function -
this approach should be expanded.
• Training with Corps troops. Corps
troops are essential to enabling
the success of the corps level of
operation. Thus to train and fight as
a corps requires dedicated corps-
level capabilities (not double hatted
as divisional capabilities) which are as
familiar with the HQ Staff as the staff are
with them. The complexity of fighting
the corps battle (Deep, Close and Rear
across all domains) and management
of the battle space requires familiarity
and cohesion that is difficult to achieve
rapidly unless formations are familiar
with each other and their processes;
an essential aspect of high readiness
deterrence forces.
With this in mind, between LTRP
commitments, HQ ARRC has chosen to
focus training towards the role of a Corps
HQ; to allow time to specialise, and
because it is arguably easier to scale
down the complexity of a certified Corps
HQ to that of a LCC HQ. In addition,
it enables our UK and multi-national
Divisional training affiliations to nest
into an operational Corps HQ; enjoying
support from an experienced rather than
adhoc HICON structure. More still, our
potential adversary uses the Army and
Corps levels of command effectively –
we therefore need a capable counter
to deter (and potentially defeat) at that
scale of command.
The challenge is finding the time and
resources to get this specialisation
right, while concurrently meeting LTRP
commitments.
Although we remain
ready if committed to the ‘fight tonight’,
our current target is to be certified as a
Corps Warfighting HQ within five years.
However, to be able to war fight at this
scale and complexity not only requires
a change of mind-set but also a radical
adjustment to the structure and training
of our NRF HQs. Acknowledging this,
perhaps we should make the bold
adjustments sooner rather than later?
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Maj Alex Michael is currently SO2 Policy
in the G7 Branch at HQ Allied Rapid
Reaction Corps. Previously he worked
as the exercise planner for Ex NOBLE
JUMP.
ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS
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