READY FOR TODAY – EVOLVING FOR TOMORROW
The conclusion was that “in general,
considering political challenges more
than operational requirements, Nations
are reluctant to deliver a clearance in
the use of AT/AV mines.” It is going to
take a shift in cultural attitude across
NATO nations to one of “understanding”
the importance of the explosive barrier
capability in order to get us moving
in the necessary direction of new
developments. Right now, only 11 of
the NATO nations report even having
a future mine program. Smart mines,
system interoperability, man-in-the-loop,
and many other concepts will not be able
to take hold and come to fruition without
acceptance that this is a necessity in
fighting a near peer, or peer adversary.
Conclusion
GMLRS System capable of firing AT2 anti-tank scatterable mines
To put things into further perspective,
the approximately 400km stretch of
terrain from Warsaw, Poland to Kaunus,
Lithuania on the E67 transits through
6 towns/villages encounterin g 7 rail
crossings, 22 powerlines, 29 major
junctions, 1,454 road crossings, and 229
river crossings varying in width. Four of
these rivers would require Corps/Division
level crossings effectively expending all
of our assets even to reach the Suwalki
gap.
Explosive Barrier Capabilities
In 1997 the Ottawa Convention, officially
titled The Convention on the Prohibition
of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and
Their Destruction, was adopted; entering
into force on 1 March 1999. The aim of
the Ottawa Convention is to eliminate
stocks of anti-personnel mines and
prevent their use throughout the globe.
162 states are party to the treaty and
as of today, 28 of the 29 NATO nations
have signed; with
the United States
agreeing to not use
AP mines outside of
the Korean peninsula.
Political
pressures
from advocacy groups,
and a seemingly high
level of risk aversion
to anything related to
mines (AP or AT) has
led the majority of the
NATO nations to allow
their explosive barrier
capability to atrophy.
Policy
changes,
operational challenges
and equipment shelf
life to name a few, continue to contribute
to a lack of both availability and
understanding of the use of explosive
barriers on the battlefield.
The current Ukraine conflict provides
several recent examples of how the use of
scatterable mines and explosive barriers
can be employed to deny an adversary
freedom of manoeuvre to gain a decisive
advantage; and the importance of this
capability. The problem facing NATO
is an insufficient supply of the policy-
compliant explosive barriers needed to
shape the manoeuvre and movement
of a near-peer adversary, or to deny
them the use of key terrain. Currently,
only four NATO nations declare having a
fully deployable scatterable AT/AV mine
capability. Five further nations report
they have some capability, but cannot
accurately detail it.
The MILENG seminar MATACAN 2016
in Spain took a detailed look at Mine
Warfare and Barrier Systems in MJO+.
In any future major military conflict
against a near-peer adversary, NATO’s
ability to conduct multiple, simultaneous
wide wet gap crossings, and to create
policy-compliant explosive barriers, will
be critical to mission success. Closing
these gaps must become an increased
priority, intellectually within the MILENG
community, and financially within
national defence budgets.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Lt Col Brian Tritten is currently SO1
Engineer Plans in the Engineer and Civil
Military Interaction branch at HQ Allied
Rapid Reaction Corps
Maj Daniel Lyons is currently SO2 EOD
and Search in the Engineer and Civil
Military Interaction branch at HQ Allied
Rapid Reaction Corps
Maj George McCrea is currently SO2
Geo Plans in the Engineer and Civil
Military Interaction branch at HQ Allied
Rapid Reaction Corps
Ribbon bridging placed over the Sava River in
Bosnia, 1995. This was an unopposed crossing.
ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS
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