ARRC JOURNAL
ENABLING THE COMMANDER’S
FREEDOM OF MANOEUVRE
(OR NOT)!
Lt Col Brian Tritten (US-A), Maj Daniel Lyons (GBR-A) and Maj George McCrea (GBR-A)
The NATO Force Structure has two critical engineering capability gaps. The first is a
lack of wide wet gap crossing capability –an issue created by national neglect of military
bridging equipment maintenance/upgrade, a reduction in quantity of bridging assets and
a lack of training during a period of persistent war on an insurgency. The second is a lack
of explosive barrier capability – caused by political challenges and a reduced appetite for
the risk; the employment of land mines in particular.
During WWII, in the Italian Campaign
alone, Allied forces constructed 2,832
Bailey type bridges and 120 floating
bridges; the longest of which spanned
343 meters. Today, as we study and
prepare for a potential conflict in the
Baltics, we are forced to the realization
that the Military Engineering (MILENG)
community may not be able to provide
the necessary mobility support to our
manoeuvre brothers and sisters to
attack and win in a land conflict due to
a lack of capable bridging assets within
NATO.While technology has adapted
to changing battlefield threats, these
changes have created unaddressed
implications elsewhere in the force.
e.g. better armour has been developed,
making several vehicles outweigh their
national bridging assets’ capabilities,
and creating an issue that cannot be
overcome without change and adaptation.
Our ability to fight and win against a near
peer adversary will require manoeuvre
as well as protection, so critical thought
must go into the development of alliance
‘wide wet gap’ crossing plans; backed
by procurement investment to ensure
NATO bridging capabilities can meet the
requirements of the forces to cross.
Wet Gap Crossings
In 2004, NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction
Corps was assigned the 29 Multinational
Engineer Brigade (29MEB). This HQ
element was designed to operate in
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ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS
AT2 anti-tank scatterable mines
a similar way to how 8 (UK) Engineer
Brigade HQ provides a staff element for
the command and control of Corps level
engineer troops today. Chief ECMI with
HQ ARRC served as the commander of
these force elements, and 29 MEB was
a permanent force structure comprised
of 5 Engineer Regiments/Battalions
(2xUK, 1xIT, 1 POL, and 1xNLD) and an
EOD Regiment. The Polish, Dutch, and
Italian engineer units remained under
their national framework until called
upon for an operation, while the UK
units, comprised mainly of reservists,
were held at a high state of readiness.
The only organic wide wet gap crossing
capability within 29MEB came from
the Polish Battalion; two bridges of up
to 200m in width. The other units only
possessed Medium Girder Bridge (MGB)
and Logistic Support Bridge (LSB) limited
capabilities.
Today, 29MEB no longer exists, and
NATO engineer troops are force
generated through the NATO Readiness
Action Plan process. For ARRCADE
FUSION 17 (AF17), a Corps Warfighting
CPX situated in the Sulwaki Gap, the
ARRC created a multinational force
structure of three battalions (Dutch,
Italian, and Polish) under a Corps
Engineer Troops Brigade HQ. This
structure was developed with bridging
in mind to maximise our limited NATO
capability. Compared to the 29MEB, the
AF17-generated brigade had several
more bridging assets by design but still
remained limited in their ability to support
continuous operations. In total, the corps
engineer brigade units in AF17 could only
emplace a maximum of eight floating
bridges over wide wet gaps of less than
131 meters. No one bridge system alone
today can cross that 343 meter span that
was encountered in Italy.