READY FOR TODAY – EVOLVING FOR TOMORROW
In summary, through comparing the
COPD and the UK TE, the key points are
as follows:
There is no difference between the
COPD and Step 1 of UK TE.
• Mission Analysis (Phase 3a of the
COPD and Step 2 of UK TE) is
conducted in the same way (purpose/
activities/output).
• The SOR is missing from Step 2 of
UK TE (SOR is critical requirement in
NATO operations).
• The
overall
process
of
COA
development according to the COPD
(Phase 3B) encompasses 4 of the 6
steps of the UK TE (Steps 3-6). The
only difference lies in plan development
(in the COPD it takes place in Phase 4
while in the UK TE it is in Step 6, after
the COA DB and COM’s decision).
• The COPD, adapted to tactical level, is
conducted in the same way as the UK
TE (6 steps), though the first employs
a different approach focusing on the
contribution to the joint plan through the
execution of tactical activities.
Notwithstanding that the UK TE is
described as ‘tactical’, the TE 6 step
process is actually better suited to
operational planning as indicated within
the comparison, rather than tactical. This
is not due to its planning concepts but its
approach. Therefore, it could be argued
that the UK TE does not support Corps
level planning and should be adapted in
a similar way as the COPD in order to
fit the second level of tactical command,
the Corps
Lessons from CRP and use of
COPD for tactical planning
So what are the specific benefits of using
the adapted COPD bearing in mind the
comparison of the different planning
processes? Application of the adapted
COPD for the CRP period used for Ex AF
17 highlighted the following points:
• There is no extant NATO tactical
planning doctrine yet; however, the
work HQ ARRC has conducted in using
an adapted COPD process will support
NATO in developing tactical level
planning doctrine.
• Using the COPD at the tactical level
allows
collaborative,
convergent
planning for NATO operations (common
understanding/process and contributes
to interoperability).
• The COPD is endorsed by SHAPE and
aligned with NATO (tactical) decision
making doctrine (ATP-3.2, ATP-3.2.2).
• Commonality of planning processes
for different roles enables a smoother
transition from Corps HQ to Land
Component Command or Joint Task
Force and recognises HQ ARRC’s
readiness rotation program.
• There is no need for additional training
of staff by changing to another process
which may result in: time and cost,
frictions with Participating Nations (most
NATO member nations use COPD as
their planning tool or a national process
based on/aligned with the COPD).
Additional observations were made from
Corps level planning. The Corps level
planning is much more challenging and
demanding in terms of time and effort
required, especially for mission analysis
and COA development. Therefore, a
common knowledge of warfighting at
tactical level (Corps, Division, Brigade
tactics) is a crucial factor and a
prerequisite for the whole HQ. Planning
should be supported by a detailed,
‘tactical planning yardsticks’ book;
to the COPD, the terminology and the
overall approach does differ and would
be of little benefit to the multinational
staff within the HQ. Nevertheless the
use of an adapted planning process
increases the risk that planning staff
may be confused in its application. This
can only be assured through specific
staff training prior to taking on different
command roles. Of utmost importance
should always be the transfer of the
implementation of the direction of the
higher command. Thus freely quoted
from Clausewitz “Knowledge must be
transferred to skills” 12 to be able to adapt
not only the process but also the skills to
use it accurately considering the level of
command.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Lt Col Ole Stephan is currently a planning
officer in the G5 branch at HQ Allied
Rapid Reaction Corps.
There is no extant NATO tactical planning
doctrine yet; however, the work HQ ARRC has
conducted in using an adapted COPD process
will support NATO in developing tactical level
planning doctrine.
During the planning itself the importance
of Deception should always be taken
into consideration; a more detailed
Intelligence Preparation of Battlefield
(IPB), focussed on the tactical details
and needs such as the emphasis on
terrain (corridors, avenues of approach,
obstacles) and enemy (understanding
the enemy) is crucial; and finally it has
to be reiterated that the joint level HQ
owns the operations design and the
Corps contributes to the achievement of
OEs and DCs through tactical activities
in support of the LCC.
Conclusion
This article articulated whether the
COPD or the UK TE is the right tool
for planning at the Corps level. Within
a NATO HQ operating at all levels
(Corps, LCC and JTF) to maintain
genuine readiness; the adapted COPD
should be the number one choice as
a planning process. Even though the
UK TE is to a high degree congruent
12 Clausewitz, On War, Berlin 1832-1834, 2.Book, 2.Chapter
ALLIED RAPID R EACTION CORPS
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