jected and given to the FSC. This
caused batteries to receive only partial resupply packages, and the FSC
had to execute back-to-back TCOs
to deliver proper packages.
Staffing Challenges
The distribution platoon was
made up mostly of new Soldiers
with limited experience in conducting TCOs. They had never established a battle rhythm, a platoon
mission-essential task list, or a standard operating procedure (SOP).
Given that this was a decisive
action rotation, the platoon was
unable to practice troop leading
procedures with observer-coach/
trainers before the force-on-force
exercise and had not gone through
the combat convoy lane of a situational training exercise. This training would have proven instrumental
to their success. It also would have
given them a chance to consider
actions like react to an improvised
explosive device, react to contact,
and set a battle rhythm. Most importantly, the training would have
helped them understand the planning process for conducting a successful TCO.
Learning Through Experience
The distribution platoon was
challenged even with simple tasks
throughout the rotation. Although
the FSC Soldiers experienced many
rotational pains, their openness to
suggestion and doctrine and their
eagerness to learn and grow assisted them in eventually setting battle
rhythms and developing their troop
leading procedures. TCO planning
and NCO involvement became priorities and increased the morale of
the FSC.
Many basic TCO questions were
asked and answered at JRTC, including the following:
How is recovery being applied to
the TCO? Are the recovery crews
embedded with the distribution
platoon as they train and rehearse
TCOs? Does the recovery SOP
make sense for both platoons?
How is medical care under fire
being conducted? Is the medic
being employed correctly?
What do the TCO primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plans look like?
Can the FSC communicate with
the units within the area of operations and the batteries to
which it is delivering supplies?
Do the other units (to include
enough supplies were available to
make the TCO worthwhile but instead with how to get the supplies
on the road immediately.
Many times, the lack of planning
led to the distribution platoon arriving back at the brigade support
area after completing a resupply
run to the three firing batteries only
to learn that one of the batteries
that they had just supplied needed
one additional item delivered. This
Proper planning at the company and platoon levels plays
a significant role in the success or failure of a TCO.
the unit being resupplied) know
the FSC’s location and where it
is set up in a defensive posture
outside of a firing point?
the FSC familiar with the
Is
products that it is delivering? If
a certain type of round is needed, does the requesting unit also
need fuses or charges?
Do NCOs and platoon leaders
know their roles in planning a
TCO with regard to precombat checks and inspections, load
plans, and checklists? Who is
submitting the trip ticket?
the FSC delivering class III
Is
(petroleum, oils, and lubricants),
class I (subsistence), and water
in the most efficient and correct
way? Should it deliver fuel to each
truck or set up a safe fuel point
on each compound? Should it do
the same with water?
composite risk management
Is
being conducted properly?
Are leaders documenting failures
in conjunction with after-action
reviews in order to develop platoon and company SOPs and
mission-essential task lists that
make the FSC effective?
Lack of Planning
The battalion S–3 did not allow
the FSC commander time to assess
and get feedback from his leaders
in the distribution platoon. The S–3
was not concerned about whether
in turn made most of the TCOs futile and destroyed the morale of the
sustainment Soldiers who delivered
these supplies.
On one such TCO to deliver class
V to C Battery, the distribution
platoon arrived at the firing base
to find out that the whole battery
had jumped locations in the middle
of the night without notifying the
FSC.
The S–3 should continuously
track the location of the battalion’s
convoys along the routes and specify events that convoys must report
to the tactical operations center,
such as convoy departure, maintenance halts, and passes through
checkpoints.
Staff Shortcomings
The battalion S–3 never got involved with TCO responsibilities. During one resupply TCO,
the distribution platoon arrived at
B Battery and set up a defensive
posture on the north side of the
battery’s fighting position. (The
distribution platoon was never
able to get all of its vehicles on a
fire position, so it became customary for them to form 360degree security against the berm
of the battery’s fire point that they
were resupplying.)
On this particular TCO, the mission was conducted at night, and as
the platoon was set up in the defen-
SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 2014 47